The Central Bank in Colombia
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Alberto Alesina & Alberto Carrasquilla & RobertoSteiner, 2000. "The Central Bank in Colombia," Working Papers Series. Documentos de Trabajo 003568, Fedesarrollo.
References listed on IDEAS
- Taylor, John B., 1999.
"The robustness and efficiency of monetary policy rules as guidelines for interest rate setting by the European central bank,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 655-679, June.
- Taylor, J.B., 1998. "The Robustness and Efficiency of Monetary Policy Rules as Guidelines for Interest Rate Setting by European Central Bank," Papers 649, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Taylor, John B., 1998. "The Robustness and Efficiency of Monetary Policy Rules as Guidelines for Interest Rate Setting by the European Central Bank," Seminar Papers 649, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983.
"Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John B. Taylor, 1999. "Introduction to "Monetary Policy Rules"," NBER Chapters, in: Monetary Policy Rules, pages 1-14, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alberto Alesina & Robert J. Barro, 2002.
"Currency Unions,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 117(2), pages 409-436.
- Alberto Alesina & Robert J. Barro, 2000. "Currency Unions," NBER Working Papers 7927, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barro, Robert & Alesina, Alberto, 2002. "Currency Unions," Scholarly Articles 4551795, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Taylor, John B., 1983. "`Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy' by Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 123-125.
- Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000.
"Inflation Targeting in Emerging-Market Countries,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 105-109, May.
- Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Countries," NBER Working Papers 7618, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Christopher J. Waller, 2000. "Policy Boards and Policy Smoothing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(1), pages 305-339.
- Alex Cukierman, 1992.
"Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981.
- Cukierman Alex, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, And Independance: Theory And Evidence," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 1-10, December.
- John B. Taylor, 1999.
"A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules,"
NBER Chapters, in: Monetary Policy Rules, pages 319-348,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John B. Taylor, 1998. "An Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules," NBER Working Papers 6768, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John B. Taylor, 1999. "Monetary Policy Rules," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number tayl99-1, December.
- Ernesto H. Stein & Jeffry Frieden, 2000. "The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy in Latin America: An Analytical Overview," Research Department Publications 3118, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Kugler, Maurice & Rosenthal, Howard, 2000.
"Checks and balances: an assessment of the institutional separation of political powers in Colombia,"
Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics
18, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Maurice Kugler & Howard Rosental, 2000. "Checks and balances: an assessment of the institutional separtion of political powers in Colombia," Working Papers Series. Documentos de Trabajo 002117, Fedesarrollo.
- Kugler, Maurice & Rosenthal, Howard, 2000. "Checks and balances: an assessment of the institutional separation of political powers in Colombia," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0018, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Juan C. Jaramillo & Roberto Steiner & Natalia Salazar, 1999.
"The political economy of exchange rate policy in Colombia,"
Working Papers Series. Documentos de Trabajo
009194, Fedesarrollo.
- Juan C. Jaramillo & Roberto Steiner & Natalia Salazar, 1999. "The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy in Colombia," Research Department Publications 3064, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Mauricio Pérez Salazar, 2001. "Costos, beneficios y orden constitucional," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 3(5), pages 129-145, July-Dece.
- Eslava, Marcela, 2010.
"Central bankers in government appointed committees,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 94(5-6), pages 363-379, June.
- Marcela Eslava, 2007. "Central Bankers In Government Appointed Committees," Documentos CEDE 002051, Universidad de los Andes - CEDE.
- Homero Cuevas, 2001. "La autonomía extrema del Banco Central en Colombia," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 3(5), pages 220-227, July-Dece.
- Carlos Gustavo Cano, 2008. "Regulación y supervisión: La otra cara de la política monetaria," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 004587, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
- Maria Angelica Arbelaez & Juan Jose Echavarria, 2002. "Credit, Financial Liberalization and Manufacturing Investment in Colombia," Research Department Publications 3145, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
More about this item
Keywords
Bancos Centrales; Política Monetaria; Independencia de la Banca Central; Instituciones Financieras; Economía Institucional; Reformas Institucionales;JEL classification:
- E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
- E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000123:002458. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lucía Fenney Pérez). General contact details of provider: .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.