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Pour une stratégie de cible d'inflation dans la zone euro

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  • Jean-Paul Pollin

Abstract

[fre] La transparence est favorable à la coordination des décisions microénomiques et à l’efficacité de la régulation monétaire. Nous montrons ainsi que la stratégie actuelle de la BCE est mal fondée dans sa conception et approximative dans ses applications : les « deux piliers » constituant des références contestables sur le fond et peu utilisées en pratique. L’adhésion à une règle monétaire, ou le recours à un dispositif de cible d’inflation, serait de nature à rendre la politique de la BCE plus compréhensible et plus prévisible. Enfin nous passons en revue les critiques habituellement adressées aux règles monétaires, et montrons qu’elles ne résistent pas à une analyse attentive. Du fait de sa jeunesse, mais aussi de sa grande indépendance, la BCE gagnerait beaucoup à adopter une stratégie de cible d’inflation. . Classification JEL : E5, E52, E58 [eng] For a strategy of inflation targeting in the euro zone . The transparency is favorable to the coordination of the microeconomic decisions and to the efficiency of the monetary regulation. We show that the current strategy of the ECB is weakly based in its conception and in its applications, the « two pillars » establishing questionable references and little used in practice. A monetary rule, or a device of inflation targeting, could return the ECB policy more understandable and more predictable. Finally we review the criticisms usually sent to the monetary rules, and show that they do not resist to an attentive analysis. Because of its big independence, the ECB would win to adopt a strategy of inflation targeting. . JEL classifications : E5, E52, E58

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Paul Pollin, 2002. "Pour une stratégie de cible d'inflation dans la zone euro," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 65(1), pages 39-68.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2002_num_65_1_3767
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2002.3767
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1997. "Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1111-1146, June.
    2. John B. Taylor, 1999. "Introduction to "Monetary Policy Rules"," NBER Chapters,in: Monetary Policy Rules, pages 1-14 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Bernanke, Ben S. & Mihov, Ilian, 1997. "What does the Bundesbank target?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1025-1053, June.
    4. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1999. "Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 607-654, June.
    5. Ehrmann, Michael & Smets, Frank, 2003. "Uncertain potential output: implications for monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(9), pages 1611-1638, July.
    6. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
    7. John B. Taylor, 1999. "A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules," NBER Chapters,in: Monetary Policy Rules, pages 319-348 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Issing,Otmar & Gaspar,Vitor & Angeloni,Ignazio & Tristani,Oreste, 2001. "Monetary Policy in the Euro Area," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521783248, April.
    9. Taylor, John B., 1999. "The robustness and efficiency of monetary policy rules as guidelines for interest rate setting by the European central bank," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 655-679, June.
    10. John B. Taylor, 1999. "Monetary Policy Rules," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number tayl99-1.
    11. Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi & Daniel Gros, 2001. "Is the ECB Sufficiently Accountable and Transparent?," Economics Working Papers 007, European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes.
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Raymond, 2009. "Vers l'indépendance des banques centrales et une politique monétaire européenne," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 8(1), pages 21-50.
    2. Miniaoui, Héla & Smida, Mounir, 2008. "Crédibilité des autorités monétaires et transparence – Quelle complémentarité dans le cas de la Tunisie? Une contribution au débat," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 84(2), pages 205-234, juin.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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