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Citations for "An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities"

by Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus

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  1. Henry, TULKENS & Parkash, CHANDER, 2006. "Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in interational environmental agreements : a conceptual discussion," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006003, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques, revised 15 Jan 2006.
  2. Emilio Calvo & Santiago J. Rubio, 2012. "Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0112, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
  3. Michael Finus & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2010. "International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty: Does the Veil of Uncertainty Help?," Discussion Papers 1003, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  4. Hans-Peter Weikard & Rob Dellink, 2008. "Sticks and Carrots for the Design of International Climate Agreements with Renegotiations," Working Papers 2008.26, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  5. Carlo Carraro & Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 2006_44, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
  6. Urs Steiner Brandt & Lone Grønbæk Kronbak, 2006. "Robustness of Sharing Rules under Climate Change - The Case of International Fisheries Agreements," Working Papers 73/06, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
  7. Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009. "The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model," Working Papers 2009.64, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  8. Thierry, BRECHET & François, GERARD & Henry, TULKENS, 2007. "Climate coalitions : a theoretical and computational appraisal," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007006, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  9. Porchiung Chou & Cheickna Sylla, 2008. "The formation of an international environmental agreement as a two-stage exclusive cartel formation game with transferable utilities," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 317-341, December.
  10. Carlo Carraro & Valentina Bosetti & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009. "The incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions: a game theoretic approach using the WITCH Model," Working Papers 2009_28, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
  11. Dritan Osmani, . "A note on optimal transfer schemes, stable coalition for environmental protection and joint maximization assumption," Working Papers FNU-176, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University.
  12. Finus, Michael & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2013. "The role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 29-43.
  13. Pedro Pintassilgo & Michael Finus & Marko Lindroos & Gordon Munro, 2010. "Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(3), pages 377-402, July.
  14. Kulmala, Soile & Levontin, Polina & Lindroos, Marko & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2010. "Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea – A Case of Trivial Cooperation," 2010 Conference (54th), February 10-12, 2010, Adelaide, Australia 59094, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
  15. Jonathan Colmer, 2011. "Asymmetry, optimal transfers and international environmental agreements," GRI Working Papers 66, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
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