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Robustness of Sharing Rules under Climate Change - The Case of International Fisheries Agreements


  • Urs Steiner Brandt

    () (Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark)

  • Lone Grønbæk Kronbak

    () (Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark)


Many international fisheries agreements involve sharing rules. The current pa-per analysis the stability of sharing rules when coping with long run changes in the composition of fish stocks in an international setting due to climate change. The exploitation of the cod stock in the Baltic Sea serves as an illustrative ex-ample. These rules are normally stable rules, but this is only true if they are not contingent on shifts in the relative distribution of density of the resource. Given the projected climatic changes in the latest IPCC report the stability of these agreements is not guaranteed. The lack of robustness of management systems of shared fish stocks with respect to exogenous changes has been addressed in sev-eral papers (see e.g. Miller (2005) and Miller and Munro (2004)). This paper builds, however, on a more rigorous game theoretic analysis conducted by Kronbak and Lindroos (2005). The main findings of this paper is that, when ex-ternalities are present, a decrease in the resource rent implies that the threat for not free riding become less serious and thereby leave less room for stable solu-tion. Generally speaking, this implies that climatic changes with a negative ef-fect on the resource rent make joint solutions less likely.

Suggested Citation

  • Urs Steiner Brandt & Lone Grønbæk Kronbak, 2006. "Robustness of Sharing Rules under Climate Change - The Case of International Fisheries Agreements," Working Papers 73/06, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:sdk:wpaper:73

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    2. Christine Roeckmann & Uwe A. Schneider & Michael A. St.John & Richard S.J. Tol, 2006. "Rebuilding the Eastern Baltic cod stock under environmental change - Part II: The economic viability of a marine protected area," Working Papers FNU-106, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2006.
    3. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2004. "An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0414, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    4. Greenberg, Joseph, 1994. "Coalition structures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.),Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 37, pages 1305-1337, Elsevier.
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    More about this item


    Climate Change; Cooperative Games; Stability of Fisheries Agreements;

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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    This item is featured on the following reading lists, Wikipedia, or ReplicationWiki pages:
    1. Socio-economics of Fisheries and Aquaculture


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