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Anti-herding and strategic consultation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Dirk Bergemann & Marco Ottaviani, 2021. "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2296, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Stephen E. Hansen & Michael McMahon, 2010. "What Do Outside Experts Bring To A Committee? Evidence From The Bank of England," Working Papers 512, Barcelona School of Economics.
  3. Hansen, Stephen & McMahon, Michael, 2011. "How Experts Decide: Identifying Preferences versus Signals from Policy Decisions," Economic Research Papers 270761, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
  4. Eberlein, Marion & Przemeck, Judith, 2008. "Whom will you choose? - Collaborator Selection and Selector’s Self-Prediction," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 12/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
  5. Dohui Woo, 2022. "Truth-telling Outcomes in a Reputational Cheap-talk Game with Binary Types," KIER Working Papers 1089, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  6. EllenE. Meade & David Stasavage, 2008. "Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 695-717, April.
  7. Millner, Antony & Ollivier, Hélène & Simon, Leo, 2020. "Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
  8. Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon & Andrea Prat, 2018. "Transparency and Deliberation Within the FOMC: A Computational Linguistics Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(2), pages 801-870.
  9. Mikael Apel & Marianna Blix Grimaldi & Isaiah Hull, 2022. "How Much Information Do Monetary Policy Committees Disclose? Evidence from the FOMC's Minutes and Transcripts," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(5), pages 1459-1490, August.
  10. Liu, Yaozhou Franklin & Sanyal, Amal, 2012. "When second opinions hurt: A model of expert advice under career concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 1-16.
  11. Chen, Chia-Hui & Ishida, Junichiro, 2015. "Careerist experts and political incorrectness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 1-18.
  12. Bar-Isaac Heski, 2012. "Transparency, Career Concerns, and Incentives for Acquiring Expertise," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-15, January.
  13. Benjamin Davies, 2022. "Why do experts give simple advice?," Papers 2209.11710, arXiv.org.
  14. Itzhak Gilboa & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci & David Schmeidler, 2010. "Objective and Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 755-770, March.
  15. Clare Leaver, 2007. "Bureaucratic Minimal Squawk Behavior: Theory and Evidence from Regulatory Agencies," Economics Series Working Papers 344, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  16. Catonini, Emiliano & Stepanov, Sergey, 2023. "Reputation and information aggregation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 208(C), pages 156-173.
  17. Di Maggio, Marco, 2009. "Accountability and Cheap Talk," MPRA Paper 18652, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Donner, Herman & Kopsch, Fredrik, 2016. "Housing Tenure and Informational Asymmetries," Working Paper Series 16/3, Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Real Estate and Construction Management & Banking and Finance.
  19. Sabourian, H. & Sibert, A.C., 2009. "Banker Compensation and Confirmation Bias," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0940, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  20. Young-Ro Yoon, 2008. "Strategic Disclosure of Valuable Information within Competitive Environments," CAEPR Working Papers 2008-022, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
  21. Zerbini, Antoine, 2023. "The Case for Lobbying Transparency," SocArXiv w6vam, Center for Open Science.
  22. Daniel Stone & Basit Zafar, 2014. "Do we follow others when we should outside the lab? Evidence from the AP top 25," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 73-102, August.
  23. Fox, Justin & Van Weelden, Richard, 2012. "Costly transparency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 142-150.
  24. David Lagziel & Ehud Lehrer, 2021. "Dynamic Screening," Working Papers 2101, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  25. Demirer, Rıza & Kutan, Ali M. & Zhang, Huacheng, 2014. "Do ADR investors herd?: Evidence from advanced and emerging markets," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 138-148.
  26. Fox, Justin & Van Weelden, Richard, 2010. "Partisanship and the effectiveness of oversight," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 674-687, October.
  27. Keiichi Morimoto, 2021. "Information Use and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(10), pages 1-22, May.
  28. Lukyanov, Georgy, 2023. "Reputation for competence in a cheap-talk setting," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 285-294.
  29. Elisabeth Schulte & Mike Felgenhauer, 2017. "Preselection and expert advice," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 693-714, August.
  30. Anbarci, Nejat & Ghosh, Saptarshi P. & Roy, Jaideep, 2017. "Information control in reputational cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 153-160.
  31. Stone, Daniel F., 2013. "Media and gridlock," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 94-104.
  32. Austin Bussing & Michael Pomirchy, 2022. "Congressional oversight and electoral accountability," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(1), pages 35-58, January.
  33. Yang, Wan-Ru, 2011. "Herding with costly information and signal extraction," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 624-632, October.
  34. Hanzhe Li, 2022. "Transparency and Policymaking with Endogenous Information Provision," Papers 2204.08876, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
  35. Ghosh, Saptarshi P. & Roy, Jaideep, 2015. "Committees with leaks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 207-214.
  36. Christian Salas, 2019. "Persuading policy-makers," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(4), pages 507-542, October.
  37. Schuett, Florian & Wagner, Alexander K., 2011. "Hindsight-biased evaluation of political decision makers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1621-1634.
  38. Gilat Levy, 2007. "Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 150-168, March.
  39. Klein, Nicolas & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2017. "Will truth out?—An advisor’s quest to appear competent," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 112-121.
  40. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2006. "Hidden Talents: Partnerships with Pareto-Improving Private Information," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0613, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  41. Ascencion Andina-Diaz & Jose A. Garcia-Martinez, 2023. "Garbling an evaluation to retain an advantage," Discussion Papers 2023-04, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).
  42. Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2009. "The Allocation of Decision-Making Authority when Principal has Reputation Concerns," MPRA Paper 20225, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  43. Rieder, Kilian, 2022. "Monetary policy decision-making by committee: Why, when and how it can work," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
  44. Talat Ulussever & Riza Demirer, 2017. "Investor herds and oil prices evidence in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) equity markets," Central Bank Review, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, vol. 17(3), pages 1-77–89.
  45. Tajika, Tomoya, 2017. "Persistence and Snap Decision Making: Inefficient Decisions by a Reputation-Concerned Expert," Discussion Paper Series 661, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  46. Fu, Qiang & Li, Ming, 2014. "Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 15-25.
  47. Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias, 2022. "Information manipulation and competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 245-263.
  48. De Moragas, Antoni-Italo, 2022. "Disclosing decision makers’ private interests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
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