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Media and gridlock

  • Stone, Daniel F.

I develop a model of the relation between the media environment and political obstructionism. I show that when voters are less informed by media, obstructionism becomes a more effective political signal for the minority party. The model thus implies that media change can cause gridlock via signaling; by contrast, the previous literature on causes of gridlock focuses on polarization and other factors. The model also makes several auxiliary predictions consistent with recent trends in U.S. politics.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 101 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 94-104

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:101:y:2013:i:c:p:94-104
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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  1. Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Joel Waldfogel, 2006. "Media Markets and Localism: Does Local News en Español Boost Hispanic Voter Turnout?," NBER Working Papers 12317, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "Media Bias," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1981, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  3. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2010. "Ideological Segregation Online and Offline," NBER Working Papers 15916, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Gilat Levy, 2004. "Anti-herding and strategic consultation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 541, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  5. Lisa George & Joel Waldfogel, 2003. "Who Affects Whom in Daily Newspaper Markets?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(4), pages 765-784, August.
  6. George, Lisa, 2007. "What's fit to print: The effect of ownership concentration on product variety in daily newspaper markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 285-303, October.
  7. Navin Kartik & R. Preston McAfee, 2007. "Signaling Character in Electoral Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 852-870, June.
  8. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2006. "What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from U.S. Daily Newspapers," NBER Working Papers 12707, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Jimmy Chan & Wing Suen, 2003. "Media as Watchdogs: The Role of News Media in Electoral Competition," Economics Working Paper Archive 497, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  10. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse Shapiro, 2005. "Media Bias and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 11664, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Jorge M. Streb, 2001. "Signaling in Political Cycles. How far are you willing to go?," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 193, Universidad del CEMA.
  12. Alicia Adsera & Carles Boix & Mark Payne, 2000. "Are You Being Served?: Political Accountability and Quality of Government," Research Department Publications 4241, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  13. James M. Snyder, Jr. & David Strömberg, 2008. "Press Coverage and Political Accountability," NBER Working Papers 13878, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Market for News," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1031-1053, September.
  15. Prat, Andrea & Strömberg, David, 2011. "The Political Economy of Mass Media," CEPR Discussion Papers 8246, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Campante, Filipe R. & Hojman, Daniel, 2010. "Media and Polarization," Working Paper Series rwp10-002, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  17. Stone, Daniel F., 2011. "Ideological media bias," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 256-271, May.
  18. Daniel Diermeier & Razvan Vlaicu, 2011. "Executive Control and Legislative Success," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(3), pages 846-871.
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