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Citations for "A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank"

by Waller, Christopher J.

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  1. RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco, 2006. "The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee," Cahiers de recherche 02-2006, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  2. Chappell, Henry Jr. & Havrilesky, Thomas M. & McGregor, Rob Roy, 1995. "Policymakers, institutions, and central bank decisions," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 113-136, May.
  3. Alan S. Blinder, 2008. "On the design of monetary policy committees," Working Paper 2008/06, Norges Bank.
  4. Helge Berger & Tonny Lybek & Volker Nitsch, 2006. "Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?," IMF Working Papers 06/281, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Mihov, Ilian & Sibert, Anne, 2002. "Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees," CEPR Discussion Papers 3278, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Alessandro Riboni, 2010. "Committees As Substitutes For Commitment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(1), pages 213-236, 02.
  7. Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2004. "Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2004 85, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
  8. Alan Blinder, 2006. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Why and How?," DNB Working Papers 092, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  9. James Bullard & Christopher J. Waller, 2002. "Central bank design in general equilibrium," Working Papers 1998-002, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  10. Mihov, Ilian & Sibert, Anne, 2006. "Credibility and Flexibility with Independent Monetary Policy Committees," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(1), pages 23-46, February.
  11. Rasmus Fatum, 2003. "One Monetary Policy and Eighteen Central Bankers: The European Monetary Policy as a Game of Strategic Delegation," EPRU Working Paper Series 03-19, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  12. Jula, Dorin, 2008. "Economic Impact of Political Cycles – The Relevance of European experinces for Romania," Working Papers of Institute for Economic Forecasting 081101, Institute for Economic Forecasting.
  13. Carl E. Walsh, 1995. "Recent Central-Bank Reforms and the Role of Price Stability as the Sole Objective of Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 237-252 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Donato Masciandaro, 1995. "Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 399-410, October.
  15. Muscatelli, V Anton, 1998. "Political Consensus, Uncertain Preferences, and Central Bank Independence," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 412-30, July.
  16. Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2011. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy?: A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1180, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  17. Beetsma, Roel M.W.J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 2006. "Political shocks and public debt: The case for a conservative central bank revisited," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 1857-1883, November.
  18. Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal central bank design: Benchmarks for the ECB," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 207-235, September.
  19. Keiichi Morimoto, 2009. "Optimal Structure of Monetary Policy Committees," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 09-36-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), revised Dec 2009.
  20. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October.
  21. Alan S. Blinder, 2008. "Making Monetary Policy by Committee," Working Papers 1051, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
  22. Manfred Neumann, 1991. "Precommitment by central bank independence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 95-112, June.
  23. Riboni, Alessandro & Ruge-Murcia, Francesco, 2010. "Monetary Policy by Committee : Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority ?," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/7683, Paris Dauphine University.
  24. Lohmann, Susanne, 1997. "Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-246, May.
  25. Eslava, Marcela, 2010. "Central bankers in government appointed committees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(5-6), pages 363-379, June.
  26. Mixon, Franklin Jr. & Upadhyaya, Kamal P., 2004. "Examining legislative challenges to central bank autonomy: macroeconomic and agency costs models," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 415-428.
  27. Christopher J. Waller, 1998. "Appointing the median voter of a policy board," Working Paper 9802, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  28. Dino Falaschetti, 2003. "Does Partisan Heritage Matter? The Case of the Federal Reserve," Microeconomics 0311003, EconWPA.
  29. Lindner, Axel, 2000. "Long-term appointment of central bankers: costs and benefits," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 639-654, November.
  30. Garcia De Paso, Jose I., 2000. "Partisan Appointments to the Central Bank: Policy Uncertainty and the Democratic Deficit," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 471-489, July.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.