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A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Lohmann, Susanne, 1997. "Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-246, May.
  2. Aquilante, Tommaso, 2018. "Undeflected pressure? The protectionist effect of political partisanship on US antidumping policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 455-470.
  3. Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2006. "Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 1-27, January.
  4. Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker & Lybek, Tonny, 2008. "Central bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 817-832, December.
  5. Christopher J. Waller, 1998. "Appointing the median voter of a policy board," Working Papers (Old Series) 9802, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  6. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1126-1139.
  7. Blinder, Alan S., 2007. "Monetary policy by committee: Why and how?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 106-123, March.
  8. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2010. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 363-416.
  9. Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal central bank design: Benchmarks for the ECB," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 207-235, September.
  10. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2008. "The Dynamic (In)Efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(5), pages 1001-1032, August.
  11. Alan S. Blinder, 2007. "On the Design of Monetary Policy Committees," Working Papers 1030, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
  12. repec:zbw:rwirep:0094 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Blinder, Alan S., 2007. "Monetary policy by committee: Why and how?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 106-123, March.
  14. Eslava, Marcela, 2010. "Central bankers in government appointed committees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(5-6), pages 363-379, June.
  15. Donato Masciandaro, 1995. "Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 399-410, October.
  16. Gabillon, Emmanuelle & Martimort, David, 2004. "The benefits of central bank's political independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 353-378, April.
  17. Alan S. Blinder, 2007. "On the Design of Monetary Policy Committees," Working Papers 1030, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
  18. Lindner, Axel, 2000. "Long-term appointment of central bankers: costs and benefits," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 639-654, November.
  19. repec:pri:cepsud:167blinder is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Alan S. Blinder, 2009. "Making Monetary Policy by Committee," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 171-194, August.
  21. Beetsma, Roel M.W.J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 2006. "Political shocks and public debt: The case for a conservative central bank revisited," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 1857-1883, November.
  22. repec:pri:cepsud:153blinder is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Henry W. Chappell & Rob Roy McGregor, 2000. "A Long History of FOMC Voting Behavior," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(4), pages 906-922, April.
  24. Marc Bassoni & André Cartapanis, 1995. "Autonomie des banques centrales et performances macro-économiques : Un réexamen," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(2), pages 415-432.
  25. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October.
  26. Muscatelli, V Anton, 1998. "Political Consensus, Uncertain Preferences, and Central Bank Independence," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 412-430, July.
  27. Jula, Dorin, 2008. "Economic Impact of Political Cycles – The Relevance of European experinces for Romania," Working Papers of Institute for Economic Forecasting 081101, Institute for Economic Forecasting.
  28. Chappell, Henry Jr. & Havrilesky, Thomas M. & McGregor, Rob Roy, 1995. "Policymakers, institutions, and central bank decisions," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 113-136, May.
  29. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7716 is not listed on IDEAS
  30. José I. García de Paso, 1993. "Central Bank Structure and monetary policy uncertainty," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 9314, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
  31. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7684 is not listed on IDEAS
  32. Manfred Neumann, 1991. "Precommitment by central bank independence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 95-112, June.
  33. Ilian Mihov & Anne Sibert, 2002. "Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees," Working Papers 232002, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
  34. Blinder, Alan S., 2007. "Monetary policy by committee: Why and how?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 106-123, March.
  35. Carl E. Walsh, 2002. "When should central bankers be fired?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, March.
  36. Keiichi Morimoto, 2009. "Optimal Structure of Monetary Policy Committees," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 09-36-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, revised Dec 2009.
  37. Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2010. "Monetary Policy Committees: Meetings And Outcomes," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(4), pages 569-588, October.
  38. Patrick Artus, 1995. "Effets internes et internationaux de l'indépendance des banques centrales," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(3), pages 857-867.
  39. Mihov, Ilian & Sibert, Anne, 2006. "Credibility and Flexibility with Independent Monetary Policy Committees," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(1), pages 23-46, February.
  40. Alan S. Blinder, 2009. "Making Monetary Policy by Committee," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 171-194, August.
  41. Bullard, James & Waller, Christopher J, 2004. "Central Bank Design in General Equilibrium," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(1), pages 95-113, February.
  42. Garcia De Paso, Jose I., 2000. "Partisan Appointments to the Central Bank: Policy Uncertainty and the Democratic Deficit," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 471-489, July.
  43. Andonie, Costel, 2023. "Dismissal power," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
  44. repec:pri:cepsud:118blinder is not listed on IDEAS
  45. Dino Falaschetti, 2003. "Does Partisan Heritage Matter? The Case of the Federal Reserve," Microeconomics 0311003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  46. Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0094, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  47. Caitlin Ainsley, 2022. "Federal reserve appointments and the politics of senate confirmation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 93-110, January.
  48. Faust, Jon, 1996. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 267-283, April.
  49. Mixon, Franklin Jr. & Upadhyaya, Kamal P., 2004. "Examining legislative challenges to central bank autonomy: macroeconomic and agency costs models," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 415-428.
  50. Francisco Ruge‐Murcia, 2022. "How do central banks make decisions?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(4), pages 1643-1670, November.
  51. Rasmus Fatum, 2003. "One Monetary Policy and Eighteen Central Bankers: The European Monetary Policy as a Game of Strategic Delegation," EPRU Working Paper Series 03-19, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  52. Carl E. Walsh, 1995. "Recent Central-Bank Reforms and the Role of Price Stability as the Sole Objective of Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 237-252, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  53. Aquilante, Tommaso, 2015. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Political Parties and Antidumping in the US," MPRA Paper 70359, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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