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Citations for "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information"

by Ben-Porath, Elchanan

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  1. Forges, Françoise, 2010. "Communication in Bayesian games: Overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5279, Paris Dauphine University.
  2. Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/168, Paris Dauphine University.
  3. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  4. Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2010. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," MPRA Paper 25895, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 394-400, July.
  6. Forges, Françoise, 2012. "Correlated equilibria and communication in games," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/171, Paris Dauphine University.
  7. Jia-wei Li, 2005. "On cheap talk in games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(2), pages 1-5.
  8. Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0511, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  9. Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions," Working Papers 2005-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  10. Vida, Péter & Āzacis, Helmuts, 2013. "A detail-free mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 101-115.
  11. Sergei Izmalkov & Matt Lepinski & Silvio Micali, 2010. "Perfect Implementation," Working Papers w0140, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  12. Dino Gerardi & Roger B. Myerson, 2005. "Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1542, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  13. Igal Milchtaich, 2014. "Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 283-350, May.
  14. Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2010. "A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 189-193, May.
  15. Olivier Gossner & Abraham Neyman & Penélope Hernández, 2005. "Optimal Use Of Communication Resources," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  16. Forges, Françoise, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/157, Paris Dauphine University.
  17. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, . "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Papers 017, Departmental Working Papers.
  18. Forges, Françoise & Vida, Péter, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
  19. Patricia Crifo & Marc-Arthur Diaye & Nathalie Greenan, 2004. "Pourquoi les entreprises évaluent-elles individuellement leurs salariés ?," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 164(3), pages 27-55.
  20. Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 222-234.
  21. Wagner, P.Achim, 2011. "Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 99-107, January.
  22. Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 1-35, November.
  23. Heller, Yuval, 2005. "A minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," MPRA Paper 7716, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Feb 2008.
  24. Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
  25. Koessler, Frederic, 2004. "Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 292-320, August.
  26. Vijay Krishna, R., 2007. "Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 584-592, January.
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