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Citations for "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information"

by Ben-Porath, Elchanan

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  1. Dino Gerardi & Roger B. Myerson, 2005. "Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1542, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0511, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  3. F. Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2003. "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types," THEMA Working Papers 2003-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  4. Serrano, Roberto & Ray, Indrajit & Kar, Anirban, 2005. "Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions," UC3M Working papers. Economics we057238, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  5. Olivier Gossner & Penelope Hernandez & Abraham Neyman, 2004. "Optimal Use of Communication Resources," Discussion Paper Series dp377, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  6. Aflahagah, Fo Kodjo Dzinyefa & Bernard, Tanguy & Viceisza, Angelino, 2015. "Communication and coordination: Experimental evidence from farmer groups in Senegal:," IFPRI discussion papers 1450, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  7. Heller, Yuval, 2005. "A minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," MPRA Paper 7716, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Feb 2008.
  8. Péter Vida & Francoise Forges, 2011. "Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case," CESifo Working Paper Series 3360, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Tristan Tomala & Yuval Heller & Eilon Solan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Post-Print hal-00715606, HAL.
  10. Vida, Péter & Āzacis, Helmuts, 2013. "A detail-free mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 101-115.
  11. Wagner, P.Achim, 2011. "Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 99-107, January.
  12. Nathalie Greenan & Marc-Arthur Diaye & Patricia Crifo, 2004. "Pourquoi les entreprises évaluent-elles individuellement leurs salariés ?," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 164(3), pages 27-55.
  13. Koessler, Frederic, 2004. "Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 292-320, August.
  14. FORGES, Françoise, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," CORE Discussion Papers 2006041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Post-Print hal-00360719, HAL.
  16. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, . "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Papers 017, Departmental Working Papers.
  17. repec:dau:papers:123456789/171 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Igal Milchtaich, 2014. "Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 283-350, May.
  19. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5279 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Jia-wei Li, 2005. "On cheap talk in games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(2), pages 1-5.
  21. Vijay Krishna, R., 2007. "Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 584-592, January.
  22. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  23. Sergei Izmalkov & Matt Lepinski & Silvio Micali, 2010. "Perfect Implementation," Working Papers w0140, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  24. repec:dau:papers:123456789/8159 is not listed on IDEAS
  25. Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2010. "A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 189-193, May.
  26. Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
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