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On cheap talk in games

Author

Listed:
  • Jia-wei Li

    (Harbin Institute of Technology)

Abstract

It has been proved in many studies that cheap talk has great influence on the players' choices of strategies in games. But the effect of cheap talk has still not been properly evaluated in game theory. Based on a novel game model with parameters denoting how one player cares for the other''s payoff, we can take the relations between players into account in games and extend the use of games theory. In this study the effect of cheap talk was analyzed by using the new game model.

Suggested Citation

  • Jia-wei Li, 2005. "On cheap talk in games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(2), pages 1-5.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-04c70023
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2005/Volume3/EB-04C70023A.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
    2. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Franklin Mixon & Rand Ressler & M. Gibson, 2009. "False advertising and experience goods: the case of political services in the U.S. senate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 83-95, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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