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Explaining Focal Points: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory "versus" Team Reasoning

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Wagner, Alexander K. & Granic, Dura-Georg, 2017. "Tie-Breaking Power in Committees," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168187, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  2. Francesco Fallucchi & Daniele Nosenzo, 2022. "The coordinating power of social norms," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, February.
  3. Fehr, Dietmar & Heinemann, Frank & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2019. "The power of sunspots: An experimental analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 123-136.
  4. Robert Sugden, 2016. "Ontology, Methodological Individualism, and the Foundations of the Social Sciences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1377-1389, December.
  5. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Mollerstrom, Johanna & Munkhammar, Sara, 2012. "Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 117-130.
  6. Baranski, Andrzej & Reuben, Ernesto & Riedl, Arno, 2025. "The Role of Fairness Ideals in Coordination Failure and Success," IZA Discussion Papers 18200, IZA Network @ LISER.
  7. Gary Charness & Alessandro Sontuoso, 2018. "The Doors of Perception," PPE Working Papers 0013, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 25 Oct 2018.
  8. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 128(3), pages 311-332.
  9. Isoni, Andrea & Poulsen, Anders & Sugden, Robert & Tsutsui, Kei, 2019. "Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 193-214.
  10. Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap & David Rojo Arjona & Robert Sugden, 2017. "Coordination when there are restricted and unrestricted options," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(1), pages 107-129, June.
  11. Isoni, Andrea & Sugden, Robert & Zheng, Jiwei, 2020. "The pizza night game: Conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
  12. Bett, Zoë & Poulsen, Anders & Poulsen, Odile, 2016. "The focality of dominated compromises in tacit coordination situations: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 29-34.
  13. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2013. "Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 5-62, March.
  14. Nicholas Bardsley & Graziano Ceddia & Rachel McCloy & Simone Pfuderer, 2022. "Why Economic Valuation Does Not Value the Environment: Climate Policy as Collective Endeavour," Environmental Values, , vol. 31(3), pages 277-293, June.
  15. Jimenez-Gomez, David, 2025. "Cooperative and competitive reasoning: From games to revolutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 237(C).
  16. Thom, James Matthew & Afzal, Uzma & Gold, Natalie, 2022. "Testing team reasoning: Group identification is related to coordination in pure coordination games," Judgment and Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 284-314, March.
  17. Bosch-Domènech, Antoni & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2013. "On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 52-67.
  18. Federica Alberti & Shaun Hargreaves Heap & Robert Sugden, 2011. "The emergence of salience: An experimental investigation," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 11-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  19. Michele Bernasconi & Matteo Galizzi, 2010. "Network formation in repeated interactions: experimental evidence on dynamic behaviour," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 9(2), pages 193-228, December.
  20. Parravano, Melanie & Poulsen, Odile, 2015. "Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 191-199.
  21. Marco Faillo & Alessandra Smerilli & Robert Sugden, 2016. "Can a single theory explain coordination? An experiment on alternative modes of reasoning and the conditions under which they are used," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  22. David Rojo Arjona, 2010. "On the content of focal points," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 10-16, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  23. Marco Faillo & Alessandra Smerilli & Robert Sugden, 2013. "The roles of level-k and team reasoning in solving coordination games," CEEL Working Papers 1306, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  24. Subhasish M Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock & David Rojo Arjona & Nathaniel T Wilcox, 2021. "Focality and Asymmetry in Multi-Battle Contests," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(636), pages 1593-1619.
  25. Poulsen, Odile & Saral, Krista J., 2018. "Coordination and focality under gain–loss framing: Experimental evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 75-78.
  26. Alessandro Sontuoso & Sudeep Bhatia, 2021. "A notion of prominence for games with natural‐language labels," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), pages 283-312, January.
  27. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2010. "Strategic Thinking," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001148, David K. Levine.
  28. Andrea Isoni & Robert Sugden & Jiwei Zheng, 2018. "The Pizza Night Game: Efficiency, Conflict and Inequality in Tacit Bargaining Games with Focal Points," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 18-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  29. Tong, Hanh T. & Freeman, David J., 2021. "Anchors of strategic reasoning in the traveler’s dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 28-38.
  30. Gonzalo Ballestero & Hadi Hosseini & Samarth Khanna & Ran I. Shorrer, 2026. "Strategic Algorithmic Monoculture: Experimental Evidence from Coordination Games," Papers 2604.09502, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2026.
  31. Zhixin Dai & Jiwei Zheng & Daniel John Zizzo, 2019. "Theories Of Reasoning and Focal Point Play With A Non-Student Sample," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 19-05, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  32. Radzvilas, Mantas, 2016. "Hypothetical Bargaining and the Equilibrium Selection Problem in Non-Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 70248, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  33. Gueye, Mamadou & Quérou, Nicolas & Soubeyran, Raphael, 2020. "Social preferences and coordination: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 26-54.
  34. Fabio Galeotti & Maria Montero & Anders Poulsen, 2022. "The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 2987-3007, April.
  35. Radzvilas, Mantas & Karpus, Jurgis, 2021. "Team reasoning without a hive mind," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(4), pages 345-353.
  36. Alberti, Federica & Sugden, Robert & Tsutsui, Kei, 2012. "Salience as an emergent property," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 379-394.
  37. J. Hausfeld & K. von Hesler & S. Goldlücke, 2021. "Strategic gaze: an interactive eye-tracking study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(1), pages 177-205, March.
  38. Maria Bigoni & Mario Blazquez De Paz & Chloé Le Coq, 2026. "Beyond Hawks and Doves: Can inequality ease coordination?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 81(1), pages 93-111, February.
  39. Stephen L. Ross & Tingyu Zhou, 2020. "Documenting Loss Aversion using Evidence of Round Number Bias," Working papers 2020-17, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  40. Gächter, Simon & Starmer, Chris & Thöni, Christian & Tufano, Fabio & Weber, Till O., 2022. "Social closeness can help, harm and be irrelevant in solving pure coordination problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
  41. Dai, Zhixin & Zheng, Jiwei & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2024. "Theories of reasoning and focal point play with a matched non-student sample," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
  42. Edward Cartwright & Michalis Drouvelis, 2020. "Social Framing Effects in Leadership: Preferences or Beliefs?," CESifo Working Paper Series 8600, CESifo.
  43. Edward Cartwright & Michalis Drouvelis, 2024. "Social framing effects in leadership by example: Preferences or beliefs?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(4), pages 1629-1651, October.
  44. David Rojo-Arjona & R. Stefania Sitzia & Jiwei Zheng, 2020. "The More The Better! Increasing Label Saliency as a way to Increase Coordination. An Experimental Investigation," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 20-02, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  45. albani, viviana & bardsley, nicholas & garcia-gallego, aurora & georgantzis, nikos & nocella, giuseppe, 2018. "Food Norms and Preferences in Schools: is there Pluralistic Ignorance?," MPRA Paper 88208, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  46. Federica Alberti & Edward J. Cartwright, 2016. "Full agreement and the provision of threshold public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 205-233, January.
  47. Stefania Sitzia & Jiwei Zheng, 2018. "Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points: An experimental investigation," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 17-02R, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  48. Stefania Sitzia & Jiwei Zheng, 2017. "Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points: An experimental investigation," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 17-02, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  49. Wolff, Irenaeus, 2016. "Elicited salience and salience-based level-k," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 134-137.
  50. Amrei Lahno & Bernd Lahno, 2018. "Team Reasoning as a Guide to Coordination," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 128(3), pages 393-422.
  51. Irenaeus Wolff, 2017. "Lucky Numbers in Simple Games," TWI Research Paper Series 107, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  52. Wolff, Irenaeus, 2025. "Heuristic centred-belief players," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
  53. Federica Nalli, 2021. "Robert Sugden’s theory of team reasoning: a critical reconstruction," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 68(1), pages 21-40, March.
  54. Stefan Penczynski & Stefania Sitzia & Jiwei Zheng, 2023. "Decomposed games, focal points, and the framing of collective and individual interests," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 20-04, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  55. Vanderschraaf, Peter, 2021. "Contractarianisms and markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 270-287.
  56. Faillo, Marco & Smerilli, Alessandra & Sugden, Robert, 2017. "Bounded best-response and collective-optimality reasoning in coordination games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 317-335.
  57. Elten, Jonas van & Penczynski, Stefan P., 2020. "Coordination games with asymmetric payoffs: An experimental study with intra-group communication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 158-188.
  58. Chen, Kehua & Zhu, Meixin & Sun, Lijun & Yang, Hai, 2024. "Combining time dependency and behavioral game: A Deep Markov Cognitive Hierarchy Model for human-like discretionary lane changing modeling," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  59. Isoni, Andrea & Poulsen, Anders & Sugden, Robert & Tsutsui, Kei, 2013. "Focal points in tacit bargaining problems: Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 167-188.
  60. Luca Corazzini, Christopher Cotton, Paola Valbonesi, 2012. "Salience, Coordination and Cooperation in Contributing to Threshold Public Goods," ISLA Working Papers 44, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  61. Bardsley, Nicholas & Ule, Aljaž, 2017. "Focal points revisited: Team reasoning, the principle of insufficient reason and cognitive hierarchy theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 74-86.
  62. David Rojo Arjona & Stefania Sitzia & Jiwei Zheng, 2021. "Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points," Working Papers 335109305, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  63. Gneezy, Uri & Rottenstreich, Yuval, 2024. "Failing to utilize potentially effective focal points: Prominence can stymie coordination on distinct actions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 68-81.
  64. Sitzia, Stefania & Zheng, Jiwei, 2019. "Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points – an experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 461-478.
  65. Wolff, Irenaeus, 2021. "The lottery player’s fallacy: Why labels predict strategic choices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 16-29.
  66. Shaun Hargreaves Heap & David Rojo Arjona & Robert Sugden, 2012. "A Popperian test of level-k theory," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 12-06, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  67. Rojo Arjona, David & Sitzia, Stefania & Zheng, Jiwei, 2022. "Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 505-523.
  68. Neil Martin, 2016. "Strategy as Mutually Contingent Choice," SAGE Open, , vol. 6(2), pages 21582440166, May.
  69. Bizer, Kilian & Meub, Lukas & Proeger, Till & Spiwoks, Markus, 2014. "Strategic coordination in forecasting: An experimental study," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 195, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  70. Jim Engle-Warnick & Sonia Laszlo & Natalia Mishagina & Erin C. Strumpf, 2013. "Coordination, Common Knowledge And An H1n1 Outbreak," CIRANO Papers 2013n-06a, CIRANO.
  71. David Bodoff, 2013. "When learning meets salience," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 241-266, February.
  72. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Luigi Luini, 2017. "Does Focality Depend on the Mode of Cognition? Experimental Evidence on Pure Coordination Games," Department of Economics University of Siena 771, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  73. Colin F. Camerer & Gideon Nave & Alec Smith, 2019. "Dynamic Unstructured Bargaining with Private Information: Theory, Experiment, and Outcome Prediction via Machine Learning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1867-1890, April.
  74. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2011-070 is not listed on IDEAS
  75. Zoe Bett & Anders Poulsen & Odile Poulsen, 2013. "How Salient is an Equal but Inefficient Outcome in a Coordination Situation? Some Experimental Evidence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 13-02-R, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  76. Graf Lambsdorff, Johann & Giamattei, Marcus & Werner, Katharina & Schubert, Manuel, 2016. "Emotion vs. cognition - Experimental evidence on cooperation from the 2014 Soccer World Cup," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-72-16, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
  77. Sugden, Robert, 2011. "Salience, inductive reasoning and the emergence of conventions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 35-47.
  78. Ireneaus Wolff, 2016. "Elicited Salience and Salience-Based Level-k," TWI Research Paper Series 103, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  79. Corazzini, Luca & Cotton, Christopher S. & Longo, Enrico & Reggiani, Tommaso, 2024. "Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).
  80. Pelle Hansen & David Rojo Arjona, 2011. "Prune or cut down: salience and Sugden’s The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 58(1), pages 53-78, March.
  81. Stefan Penczynski & Stefania Sitzia & Jiwei Zheng, 2020. "Compound games, focal points, and the framing of collective and individual interests," Working Papers 305138214, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  82. repec:uea:wcbess:13-02 is not listed on IDEAS
  83. Alessandra Smerilli, 2012. "We-thinking and vacillation between frames: filling a gap in Bacharach’s theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(4), pages 539-560, October.
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