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Lucky Numbers in Simple Games

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  • Irenaeus Wolff

Abstract

Simple game structures such as coordination, discoordination, hide-and seek, and Colonel-Blotto games have been used to model a wide range of economically relevant situations. Yet, Nash-equilibrium, and alternative theories that have been proposed in the literature, notoriously fail to explain observed behaviorinthesegames. Thispaperproposesabounded-rationalityapproachinwhich players lexicographically employ team reasoning, choose ‘lucky numbers’ (the choice they would pick in a lottery), and randomise uniformly. This three-step procedure is able to organise the data across many diferent frames for coordination, discoordination, and hide-and-seek games. Moreover, it predicts three general regularities that bear out on the existing data and additional data from a Colonel-Blotto game and a Rock-Paper-Scissors-type of game.

Suggested Citation

  • Irenaeus Wolff, 2017. "Lucky Numbers in Simple Games," TWI Research Paper Series 107, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  • Handle: RePEc:twi:respas:0107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Bounded Rationality; Level-k; Salience; Heuristic; Hide & Seek; Discoordination; Rock-Paper-Scissors; Colonel Blotto; Representativeness;

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