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Strategic Reasoning in Hide-and-Seek Games: A Note

  • Timo Heinrich

    ()

    (University of Duisburg-Essen, Department of Economics, Germany)

  • Irenaeus Wolff

    ()

    (Thurgau Institute of Economics at the University of Konstanz, Department of Economics, Germany)

Aggregate behavior in two-player hide-and-seek games deviates systematically from the mixed-strategy equilibrium prediction of assigning all actions equal probabilities (Rubinstein and Tversky, 1993, Rubinstein et al., 1996, Rubinstein, 1999). As Crawford and Iriberri (2007) point out, this deviation can be explained by strategic level-k reasoning. Here we provide empirical evidence that, indeed, it is non-equilibrium beliefs that lead to the behaviour observed in the earlier studies: when a player's opponent is forced to play the equilibrium strategy, the player's choices are uniformly spread over the action space. At the same time, we find robust evidence of an unexpected framing effect.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Konstanz in its series Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz with number 2012-11.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 19 Mar 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:knz:dpteco:1211
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  1. Ho, Teck Hua & Weigelt, Keith & Camerer, Colin, 1996. "Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best-Response in Experimental P-Beauty Contests," Working Papers 974, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, 2006. "Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1737-1768, December.
  3. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December.
  4. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2010. "Strategic Thinking," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001148, David K. Levine.
  5. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007. "Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental "Hide-and-Seek" Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1731-1750, December.
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