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Salience, inductive reasoning and the emergence of conventions

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  • Sugden, Robert

Abstract

This paper develops Lewis's theory of conventions to show that the spontaneous emergence of conventions depends on shared conceptions of salience. It offers a reconstruction of a mode of reasoning that is compatible with the emergence of conventions, and argues that such reasoning is pragmatically rational. This is a form of non-Bayesian inductive reasoning in which an individual's private and subjective conceptions of salience can influence the inferences she makes. This mode of reasoning is then shown to be pragmatically rational in a more general sense, relevant to problems of induction discussed in the philosophy of science.

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  • Sugden, Robert, 2011. "Salience, inductive reasoning and the emergence of conventions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1-2), pages 35-47, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:79:y:2011:i:1-2:p:35-47
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    7. Cubitt, Robin P. & Sugden, Robert, 2003. "Common Knowledge, Salience And Convention: A Reconstruction Of David Lewis' Game Theory," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 175-210, October.
    8. Boyer, Robert & Orlean, Andre, 1992. "How Do Conventions Evolve?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 165-177, October.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Alberti, Federica & Sugden, Robert & Tsutsui, Kei, 2012. "Salience as an emergent property," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 379-394.
    3. Pelle Hansen & David Rojo Arjona, 2011. "Prune or cut down: salience and Sugden’s The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 58(1), pages 53-78, March.
    4. Erik W. Matson & Daniel B. Klein, 2022. "Convention without convening," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 1-24, March.
    5. Brousseau, Eric & Garrouste, Pierre & Raynaud, Emmanuel, 2011. "Institutional changes: Alternative theories and consequences for institutional design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1-2), pages 3-19, June.
    6. Robert Sugden, 2016. "Ontology, Methodological Individualism, and the Foundations of the Social Sciences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1377-1389, December.
    7. Königsheim, C. & Lukas, M. & Nöth, M., 2019. "Salience theory: Calibration and heterogeneity in probability distortion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 477-495.
    8. Alan Hamlin, 2023. "The rule of rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 231-250, June.
    9. Anders Poulsen & Axel Sonntag, 2019. "Focality is Intuitive - Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Time Pressure in Coordination Games," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 19-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    10. Herrmann-Pillath Carsten & Guo Man, 2017. "Ritual and property: Theorizing a Chinese case," Man and the Economy, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-24, June.
    11. Leland, Jonathan W. & Schneider, Mark, 2018. "A theory of focal points in 2 × 2 games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 75-89.
    12. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2012. "The ‘Economics of Attention’: A New Avenue of Research in Cognitive Economics," GREDEG Working Papers 2012-12, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Salience Induction Convention;

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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