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Citations for "Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information"

by FORGES , Françoise

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  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information," Working Papers 1457, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  2. Francoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," Post-Print hal-00360743, HAL.
  3. Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, Péter, 2012. "Collusive Communication Schemes in a First-Price Auction," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/11, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Belief Free Incomplete Information Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1629, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  5. Blume, Andreas, 2012. "A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 510-517.
  6. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1628, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Tang, Qianfeng, 2015. "Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 111-116.
  8. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
  9. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
  10. Milchtaich, Igal, 2004. "Random-player games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 353-388, May.
  11. Liu, Qingmin, 2015. "Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 49-75.
  12. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1909R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2014.
  13. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2018, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  14. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2009. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  15. Igal Milchtaich, 2014. "Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 283-350, May.
  16. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014. "Communication in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
  17. Jackson, Matthew O. & Rodriguez-Barraquer, Tomas & Tan, Xu, 2012. "Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 198-216.
  18. Alfredo Di Tillio, 2006. "Subjective Expected Utility in Games," Working Papers 311, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  19. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2013. "Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 179-191.
  20. Ray, Indrajit, 1996. "Efficiency in correlated equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 157-178, December.
  21. Robert Nau, 2015. "Risk-neutral equilibria of noncooperative games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 171-188, February.
  22. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin A. Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2014. "Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000898, David K. Levine.
  23. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, volume 4, chapter 12, pages 619-702 Elsevier.
  24. Moreno, Diego & Ferreira, José Luis, 1995. "Cooperación y renegociación en juegos no cooperativos," DE - Documentos de Trabajo. Economía. DE 3363, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  25. F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  26. Ferenc Forgó, 2011. "Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 19(2), pages 201-213, June.
  27. Tang, Qianfeng, 2015. "Interim partially correlated rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 36-44.
  28. Liu, Qingmin, 2009. "On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2115-2145, September.
  29. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2010. "Signaling and mediation in games with common interests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 670-682, March.
  30. Forgó, Ferenc, 2010. "A generalization of correlated equilibrium: A new protocol," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 186-190, November.
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