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Citations for "Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information"

by FORGES , Françoise

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  1. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2012. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08rrr, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Belief Free Incomplete Information Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001569, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Jackson, Matthew O. & Rodriguez-Barraquer, Tomas & Tan, Xu, 2012. "Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 198-216.
  4. Forgó, Ferenc, 2010. "A generalization of correlated equilibrium: A new protocol," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 186-190, November.
  5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1821RR, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2012.
  6. Ray, I., . "Efficiency in correlated equilibrium," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1243, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2010. "Signaling and mediation in games with common interests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 670-682, March.
  8. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014. "Communication in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
  9. Blume, Andreas, 2012. "A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 510-517.
  10. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin A. Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2014. "Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000898, David K. Levine.
  11. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001574, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1909, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  13. Di Tillio, Alfredo, 2008. "Subjective expected utility in games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(3), September.
  14. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine.
  15. Milchtaich, Igal, 2004. "Random-player games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 353-388, May.
  16. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2013. "Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 179-191.
  17. F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  18. Liu, Qingmin, 2009. "On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2115-2145, September.
  19. Igal Milchtaich, 2014. "Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 283-350, May.
  20. Forges, Françoise, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/157, Paris Dauphine University.
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