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Citations for "Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information"

by FORGES , Françoise

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  1. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2013. "Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 179-191.
  2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1251-1308, 07.
  3. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014. "Communication in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
  4. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2012. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08rrr, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  5. Jackson, Matthew O. & Rodriguez-Barraquer, Tomas & Tan, Xu, 2012. "Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 198-216.
  6. Igal Milchtaich, 2014. "Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 283-350, May.
  7. Milchtaich, Igal, 2004. "Random-player games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 353-388, May.
  8. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine.
  9. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1909, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  10. F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  11. Forges, Françoise, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/157, Paris Dauphine University.
  12. Ray, Indrajit, 1996. "Efficiency in correlated equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 157-178, December.
  13. Di Tillio, Alfredo, 2008. "Subjective expected utility in games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(3), September.
  14. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin A. Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2014. "Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000898, David K. Levine.
  15. Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, Péter, 2012. "Collusive Communication Schemes in a First-Price Auction," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/11, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  16. Liu, Qingmin, 2009. "On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2115-2145, September.
  17. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Belief Free Incomplete Information Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001569, UCLA Department of Economics.
  18. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001574, UCLA Department of Economics.
  19. Robert Nau, 2015. "Risk-neutral equilibria of noncooperative games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 171-188, February.
  20. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2010. "Signaling and mediation in games with common interests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 670-682, March.
  21. Forgó, Ferenc, 2010. "A generalization of correlated equilibrium: A new protocol," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 186-190, November.
  22. Blume, Andreas, 2012. "A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 510-517.
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