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Citations for "Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information"

by FORGES , Françoise

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  1. Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A & Morris, Stephen, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," CEPR Discussion Papers 10792, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Liu, Qingmin, 2009. "On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2115-2145, September.
  3. Di Tillio, Alfredo, 2008. "Subjective expected utility in games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(3), September.
  4. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2009. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1821R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Dec 2011.
  6. Jackson, Matthew O. & Rodriguez-Barraquer, Tomas & Tan, Xu, 2012. "Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 198-216.
  7. Helmuts Āzacis & Péter Vida, 2015. "Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 125-160, January.
  8. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
  9. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2012. "Communication in Cournot Oligopoly," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20121, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  10. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Belief Free Incomplete Information Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001569, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Robert Nau, 2015. "Risk-neutral equilibria of noncooperative games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 171-188, February.
  12. Milchtaich, Igal, 2004. "Random-player games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 353-388, May.
  13. Francoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," Post-Print hal-00360743, HAL.
  14. F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  15. Tang, Qianfeng, 2015. "Interim partially correlated rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 36-44.
  16. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2013. "Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 179-191.
  17. Forgó, Ferenc, 2010. "A generalization of correlated equilibrium: A new protocol," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 186-190, November.
  18. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1909, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  19. Blume, Andreas, 2012. "A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 510-517.
  20. Ray, I., . "Efficiency in correlated equilibrium," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1243, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  21. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1926, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  22. Tang, Qianfeng, 2015. "Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 111-116.
  23. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001574, UCLA Department of Economics.
  24. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
  25. Moreno, Diego & Ferreira, José Luis, 1995. "Cooperación y renegociación en juegos no cooperativos," DE - Documentos de Trabajo. Economía. DE 3363, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  26. Igal Milchtaich, 2014. "Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 283-350, May.
  27. Liu, Qingmin, 2015. "Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 49-75.
  28. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, volume 4, chapter 12, pages 619-702 Elsevier.
  29. Ferenc Forgó, 2011. "Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 19(2), pages 201-213, June.
  30. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2010. "Signaling and mediation in games with common interests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 670-682, March.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.