A generalization of correlated equilibrium: A new protocol
A new correlation scheme (leading to a special equilibrium called "soft" correlated equilibrium) is introduced for finite games. After randomization over the outcome space, players have the choice either to follow the recommendation of an umpire blindly or freely choose some other action except the one suggested. This scheme can lead to Pareto-better outcomes than the simple extension introduced by [Moulin, H., Vial, J.-P., 1978. Strategically zero-sum games: the class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon. International Journal of Game Theory 7, 201-221]. The informational and interpretational aspects of soft correlated equilibria are also discussed in detail. The power of the generalization is illustrated in the prisoners's dilemma and a congestion game.
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Volume (Year): 60 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 186-190
| Handle: | RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:60:y:2010:i:3:p:186-190 |
| Contact details of provider: | Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
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