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Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Jeremy Edwards & Wolfgang Eggert & Alfons J. Weichenrieder, 2006. "The Measurement of Firm Ownership and its Effect on Managerial Pay," CESifo Working Paper Series 1774, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Giorgio Canarella & Mahmoud M. Nourayi, 2008. "Executive compensation and firm performance: adjustment dynamics, non-linearity and asymmetry," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(4), pages 293-315.
  3. Shijun Cheng & John Evans & Nandu Nagarajan, 2008. "Board size and firm performance: the moderating effects of the market for corporate control," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 121-145, August.
  4. Miguel Antón & Florian Ederer & Mireia Giné & Martin Schmalz, 2016. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2046R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2017.
  5. Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Szafarz, Ariane, 2011. "The modern corporation as a safe haven for taste-based discrimination: An agency model of hiring decisions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 487-497, August.
  6. Pierre-Yves Néron, 2015. "Egalitarianism and Executive Compensation: A Relational Argument," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 171-184, November.
  7. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Balakrishnan, Karthik & Cohen, Daniel, 2012. "Corporate governance and the information environment: Evidence from state antitakeover laws," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 185-204.
  8. Kim, E. Han & Lu, Yao, 2011. "CEO ownership, external governance, and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 272-292.
  9. Martini, Jan-Thomas & Niemann, Rainer & Simons, Dirk, 2014. "Management incentives under formula apportionment: Tax-induced distortions of effort and compensation in a principal-agent setting," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 168, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
  10. repec:rss:jnljms:v7i6p5 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Ozerturk, Saltuk, 2005. "Board independence and CEO pay," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 260-265, August.
  12. Boyle, Glenn & Roberts, Helen, 2013. "CEO presence on the compensation committee: a puzzle," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 16-26.
  13. Urzúa I., Francisco, 2009. "Too few dividends? Groups' tunneling through chair and board compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 245-256, April.
  14. Singh, Ravi & Ruiz-Verdú, Pablo, 2014. "Board Independence, CEO Pay, and Camouflaged Compensation," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB wb140704, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
  15. Woo-Jin Chang & Rachel M. Hayes & Stephen A. Hillegeist, 2016. "Financial Distress Risk and New CEO Compensation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(2), pages 479-501, February.
  16. Henrik Cronqvist & Fredrik Heyman & Mattias Nilsson & Helena Svaleryd & Jonas Vlachos, 2009. "Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(1), pages 309-339, February.
  17. Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2016. "Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(1), pages 137-192, March.
  18. Matthias Benz & Marcel Kucher & Alois Stutzer, "undated". "Are Stock Options the Managers' Blessing? Stock Option Compensation and Institutional Controls," IEW - Working Papers 061, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  19. Cornell, Bradford, 2004. "Compensation and recruiting: private universities versus private corporations," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 37-52, January.
  20. Cornell, Bradford, 2002. "Compensation and Recruiting: Private Universities versus Private Corporations," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management qt6z76z49q, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
  21. Dittmann, Ingolf & Maug, Ernst & Zhang, Dan, 2011. "Restricting CEO pay," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1200-1220, September.
  22. Palmberg, Johanna, 2012. "Family Control and Executive Compensation," Ratio Working Papers 186, The Ratio Institute.
  23. Trojanowski, G., 2004. "Ownership structure as a mechanism of corporate governance," Other publications TiSEM 5dbc874d-d1d0-44a5-9717-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  24. Cheng, Shijun & Indjejikian, Raffi, 2009. "Managerial influence and CEO performance incentives," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 115-126, June.
  25. Julien Daubanes & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2013. "Activists versus Captured Regulators," CESifo Working Paper Series 4444, CESifo Group Munich.
  26. Maug, Ernst & Dittmann, Ingolf, 2007. "Lower salaries and no options : the optimal structure of executive pay
    [Lower salaries and no options? On the optimal structure of executive pay]
    ," Papers 07-41, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
  27. repec:spr:joptap:v:177:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10957-018-1273-x is not listed on IDEAS
  28. Nanda, Vikram & Onal, Bunyamin, 2016. "Incentive contracting when boards have related industry expertise," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-22.
  29. Jan Thomas Martini & Rainer Niemann & Dirk Simons, 2014. "Management Incentives under Formula Apportionment - Tax-Induced Distortions of Effort and Compensation in a Principal-Agent Setting -," CESifo Working Paper Series 4908, CESifo Group Munich.
  30. Daniels, Kenneth N. & Vijayakumar, Jayaraman, 2007. "Does underwriter reputation matter in the municipal bond market?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 59(6), pages 500-519.
  31. Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, "undated". "Was erkl�rt die steigenden Managerl�hne? Ein Diskussionsbeitrag," IEW - Working Papers 081, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  32. Hsin-Hui Chiu & Lars Oxelheim & Clas Wihlborg & Jianhua Zhang, 2016. "Macroeconomic Fluctuations as Sources of Luck in CEO Compensation," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 136(2), pages 371-384, June.
  33. David De Meza & David C Webb, 2004. "Principal Agent Problems Under Loss Aversion: An Application to Executive Stock Options," FMG Discussion Papers dp478, Financial Markets Group.
  34. repec:spr:joptap:v::y::i::d:10.1007_s10957-018-1273-x is not listed on IDEAS
  35. Jin, Li, 2002. "CEO compensation, diversification, and incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 29-63, October.
  36. Richard Heaney & Vineet Tawani & John Goodwin, 2010. "Australian CEO Remuneration," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 29(2), pages 109-127, June.
  37. Jeremy Edwards & Wolfgang Eggert & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2009. "Corporate governance and pay for performance: evidence from Germany," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, January.
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