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Corporate governance and pay for performance: evidence from Germany

Author

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  • Jeremy Edwards

    ()

  • Wolfgang Eggert

    ()

  • Alfons Weichenrieder

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeremy Edwards & Wolfgang Eggert & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2009. "Corporate governance and pay for performance: evidence from Germany," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:10:y:2009:i:1:p:1-26 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-008-0050-y
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10101-008-0050-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sendhil Mullainathan & Marianne Bertrand, 2000. "Agents with and without Principals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 203-208.
    2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    3. Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov & Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang, 2002. "Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2741-2771, December.
    4. repec:fth:prinin:430 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:hrv:faseco:30747162 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
    7. Heitor V. Almeida & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2006. "A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2637-2680, December.
    8. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112.
    9. Larry H. P. Lang & Mara Faccio & Leslie Young, 2001. "Dividends and Expropriation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 54-78.
    10. Mikael Lindahl & Alan B. Krueger, 2001. "Education for Growth: Why and for Whom?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1101-1136, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dyballa, Katharina & Kraft, Kornelius, 2016. "How Do Labor Representatives Affect Incentive Orientation of Executive Compensation?," IZA Discussion Papers 10153, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Dyballa, Katharina & Kraft, Kornelius, 2015. "Does codetermination affect the composition of variable versus fixed parts of executive compensation?," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-053, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    3. Andreas, Jörn Michael & Rapp, Marc Steffen & Wolff, Michael, 2010. "Determinants of director compensation in two-tier systems: evidence from German panel data," CEFS Working Paper Series 2010-06, Technische Universität München (TUM), Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ownership structure; Manager remuneration; Pay for performance; Corporate governance; Germany; G32; L25; M52;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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