Blockholder leverage and payout policy: Evidence from French holding companies
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Abstract
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DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12415
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Other versions of this item:
- Anantavrasilp, Sereeparp & De Jong, Abe & DeJong, Douglas V. & Hege, Ulrich, 2019. "Blockholder Leverage and Payout Policy: Evidence from French Holding Companies," TSE Working Papers 19-1045, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Sereeparp Anantavrasilp & Abe de Jong & Douglas V. Dejong & Ulrich Hege, 2020. "Blockholder Leverage and Payout Policy: Evidence from French Holding Companies," Post-Print hal-03048905, HAL.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Justin Hung Nguyen & Buhui Qiu, 2022. "The effect of skilled labor intensity on corporate dividend payouts," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(5-6), pages 963-1010, May.
- Giovanna Nicodano & Luca Regis, 2023. "Leverage and Interest Rates," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 692 JEL Classification: G, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Silvia Rossetto & Nassima Selmane & Raffaele Staglianò, 2023.
"Ownership concentration and firm risk: The moderating role of mid‐sized blockholders,"
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1-2), pages 377-410, January.
- Rossetto, Silvia & Selmane, Nassima & Staglianò, Raffaele, 2022. "Ownership concentration and firm risk: The moderating role of mid-sized blockholders," TSE Working Papers 22-1346, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Silvia Rossetto & Nassima Selmane & Raffaele Stagliano, 2022. "Ownership concentration and firm risk: the moderating role of mid-sized blockholders," Post-Print hal-04067634, HAL.
- François Belot & Timothee Waxin, 2025. "Government awards to CEOs," Post-Print hal-04659614, HAL.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
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