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Was erkl�rt die steigenden Managerl�hne? Ein Diskussionsbeitrag

Author

Listed:
  • Matthias Benz
  • Alois Stutzer

Abstract

Die Entlohnung von Topmanagern ist in den westlichen Industriel�ndern �ber die letzten Jahre markant angestiegen. Wir stellen verschiedene Ans�tze dar, welche diese Entwicklung zu erkl�ren versuchen, und pr�fen sie auf ihren Erkl�rungsgehalt: (1) Die Entwicklung ist das Ergebnis eines gut funktionierenden Marktprozesses; sie beruht auf strukturellen Ver�nderungen auf der Nachfrage- bzw. auf der Angebotsseite des Managermarktes; (2) Die Entwicklung reflektiert 'rent seeking': infolge von Marktunvollkommenheiten k�nnen Manager als Anbieter von Managementdienstleistungen die Nachfrage nach diesen Leistungen beeinflussen. Managerentlohnung wird dabei mit der Qualit�t der corporate governance in Verbindung gebracht; (3) Ein eigener Erkl�rungsvorschlag bringt die Entwicklung in den USA mit der Einf�hrung von Offenlegungsvorschriften f�r Spitzenentsch�digungen im Jahre 1992 in Zusammenhang: diese haben einen sich selbst verst�rkenden Prozess der Referenzgruppenentlohnung in Gang gesetzt. Abschliessend werden institutionelle Reformen diskutiert, die Markt- und Kontrollkr�fte im Managermarkt st�rken k�nnen.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, "undated". "Was erkl�rt die steigenden Managerl�hne? Ein Diskussionsbeitrag," IEW - Working Papers 081, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  • Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:081
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    2. John M. Abowd & David S. Kaplan, 1999. "Executive Compensation: Six Questions That Need Answering," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 145-168, Fall.
    3. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691.
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    5. Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1619-1650, August.
    6. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics,in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563 Elsevier.
    7. Sendhil Mullainathan & Marianne Bertrand, 2000. "Agents with and without Principals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 203-208, May.
    8. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    9. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Managerentlohnung;

    JEL classification:

    • M1 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration

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