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Was erklärt die steigenden Managerlöhne? Ein Diskussionsbeitrag

  • Matthias Benz
  • Alois Stutzer

Die Entlohnung von Topmanagern ist in den westlichen Industrieländern über die letzten Jahre markant angestiegen. Wir stellen verschiedene Ansätze dar, welche diese Entwicklung zu erklären versuchen, und prüfen sie auf ihren Erklärungsgehalt: (1) Die Entwicklung ist das Ergebnis eines gut funktionierenden Marktprozesses; sie beruht auf strukturellen Veränderungen auf der Nachfrage- bzw. auf der Angebotsseite des Managermarktes; (2) Die Entwicklung reflektiert 'rent seeking': infolge von Marktunvollkommenheiten können Manager als Anbieter von Managementdienstleistungen die Nachfrage nach diesen Leistungen beeinflussen. Managerentlohnung wird dabei mit der Qualität der corporate governance in Verbindung gebracht; (3) Ein eigener Erklärungsvorschlag bringt die Entwicklung in den USA mit der Einführung von Offenlegungsvorschriften für Spitzenentschädigungen im Jahre 1992 in Zusammenhang: diese haben einen sich selbst verstärkenden Prozess der Referenzgruppenentlohnung in Gang gesetzt. Abschliessend werden institutionelle Reformen diskutiert, die Markt- und Kontrollkräfte im Managermarkt stärken können.

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Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich in its series IEW - Working Papers with number 081.

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  1. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
  2. Oyer, Paul, 2001. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?," Research Papers 1686, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  3. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691, August.
  4. John M. Abowd & David S. Kaplan, 1999. "Executive Compensation: Six Questions That Need Answering," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 145-168, Fall.
  5. John M. Abowd & Michael Bognanno, 1995. "International Differences in Executive and Managerial Compensation," NBER Chapters, in: Differences and Changes in Wage Structures, pages 67-104 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2000. "Agents with and without Principals," Working Papers 809, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  7. Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
  8. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
  9. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563 Elsevier.
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