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The Modern Corporation as a Safe Haven for Taste-Based Discrimination: An Agency Model of Hiring Decisions

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre-Guillaume Méon
  • Ariane Szafarz

Abstract

This paper proposes a principal–agent model of labour market discrimination. In this model, the firm manager is a taste-based discriminator and has to make unobservable hiring decisions that determine the shareholder's profits, because workers differ in skill. The model shows that performance-based contracts may moderate the manager's propensity to discriminate, but that they are unlikely to fully eliminate discrimination. Moreover, the model predicts that sectors with high skill leverages discriminate less. Finally, the impacts of a wage gap between groups and of a diversity premium are investigated.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Ariane Szafarz, 2011. "The Modern Corporation as a Safe Haven for Taste-Based Discrimination: An Agency Model of Hiring Decisions," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/88635, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/88635
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    Cited by:

    1. Sophie Hennekam & Jonathan Peterson & Loubna Tahssain-Gay & Jean-Pierre Dumazert, 2019. "Recruitment discrimination: how organizations use social power to circumvent laws and regulations," Post-Print hal-03232777, HAL.
    2. Colin P. Green & John S. Heywood & Nikolaos Theodoropoulos, 2014. "Performance pay and ethnic earnings differences in Britain," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(3), pages 798-823.
    3. Anastasia Cozarenco & Ariane Szafarz, 2025. "Bias in Mission-Driven Finance: Discrimination or Mission Drift?," Working Papers CEB 25-004, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    4. Isabelle Agier & Ariane Szafarz, 2013. "Subjectivity in credit allocation to micro-entrepreneurs: evidence from Brazil," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 263-275, June.
    5. Agier, Isabelle & Szafarz, Ariane, 2013. "Microfinance and Gender: Is There a Glass Ceiling on Loan Size?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 165-181.
    6. Hirsch, Boris & Müller, Steffen, 2014. "Firm leadership and the gender pay gap: do active owners discriminate more than hired managers?," Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 47(1-2), pages 129-142.
    7. Colin P. Green & John S. Heywood & Nikolaos Theodoropoulos, 2012. "Performance Pay and Ethnic Wage Differences in Britain," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 06-2012, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    8. Mahmood Arai & Moa Bursell & Lena Nekby, 2011. "The Reverse Gender Gap in Ethnic Discrimination: Employer Priors against Men and Women with Arabic Names," DULBEA Working Papers 11-09, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    9. Colin Green & John Heywood, 2012. "Don't Forget the Gravy! Are Bonuses and Time Rates Complements?," Working Papers 13424023, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    10. Merlino, Luca Paolo, 2012. "Discrimination, technology and unemployment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 557-567.
    11. Sekkat, Khalid & Szafarz, Ariane & Tojerow, Ilan, 2015. "Women at the Top in Developing Countries: Evidence from Firm-Level Data," IZA Discussion Papers 9537, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Ederington Josh & Minier Jenny & Jill Stowe C., 2019. "Risk and Discrimination," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(3), pages 1-14, July.
    13. Julien Picault, 2023. "A strategic approach to managerial compliance with equal pay policies," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 3(8), pages 1-21, August.
    14. Andrea Garnero, 2015. "Workforce diversity, productivity and wages in France: the role of managers vs. the proprietary structure of the firm," Working Papers CEB 15-039, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    15. Labie, Marc & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Mersland, Roy & Szafarz, Ariane, 2015. "Discrimination by microcredit officers: Theory and evidence on disability in Uganda," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 58, pages 44-55.
    16. Sait Bayrakdar & Andrew King, 2022. "Job Satisfaction and Sexual Orientation in Britain," Work, Employment & Society, British Sociological Association, vol. 36(1), pages 21-39, February.
    17. Drori, Israel & Manos, Ronny & Santacreu-Vasut, Estefania & Shoham, Amir, 2020. "How does the global microfinance industry determine its targeting strategy across cultures with differing gender values?," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 55(5).
    18. Sophie Hennekam & Jonathan Peterson & Loubna Tahssain-Gay & Jean-Pierre Dumazert, 2021. "Recruitment discrimination: how organizations use social power to circumvent laws and regulations," Post-Print hal-03497498, HAL.
    19. Anastasia Cozarenco & Ariane Szafarz, 2024. "How to identify lending bias when the lender's goal is not profit?," Working Papers CEB 24-007, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

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