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Bundling in Internetmärkten: Ökonomische Besonderheiten, Wettbewerbseffekte und Regulierungsimplikationen

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  • Bartelt, Nadja

Abstract

Das Zusammenschnüren verschiedener Produkte zu einem Paket für einen vergünstigten Preis - das sogenannte Bundling - stellt in traditionellen Märkten eine beliebte Strategie dar, um Produkte an Konsumenten zu vertreiben. Internetmärkte weisen im Vergleich zu traditionellen Märkten einige ökonomische Besonderheiten auf, wie beispielsweise die Plattformökonomik oder die Ökonomik personalisierter Daten. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, unter Einbezug der ökonomischen Besonderheiten herauszufinden, in welchen Formen Bundling in Internetmärkten auftreten kann und welche Wettbewerbseffekte sowie Auswirkungen auf die Gesamtwohlfahrt dies nach sich zieht. Schließlich sollen Regulierungsimplikationen für den Umgang mit Bundling in Internetmärkten festgelegt werden. Dazu werden fünf verschiedene Falltypen entwickelt und deren spezifische Wohlfahrtseffekte analysiert. Anschließend werden zwei aktuelle Bundling-Fälle, der Google-Fall und der AT&T und Time Warner-Fall, anhand der vorhergehenden Analyse praktisch untersucht. Das Ergebnis der Arbeit zeigt sowohl positive als auch negative wohlfahrts-verändernde Auswirkungen innerhalb verschiedener Bereiche. Während die Konsumenten der Inhalte oftmals einen Vorteil aus dem Bundling generieren können, werden Wettbewerber häufig aufgrund der Verschiebung von Marktmacht zugunsten der Bündler benachteiligt. Besonders stark sind die negativen Wohlfahrtseffekte bei bereits vorliegenden marktmächtigen Positionen seitens der Bündler. Es gilt deshalb die Vorteile mit den Nachteilen eines Bundlings im Internetmarkt im Einzelfall gegeneinander abzuwägen.

Suggested Citation

  • Bartelt, Nadja, 2018. "Bundling in Internetmärkten: Ökonomische Besonderheiten, Wettbewerbseffekte und Regulierungsimplikationen," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 120, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:120
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    Keywords

    Bundling; Tying; Internetökonomie; Wettbewerbspolitik; Industrieökonomik; Medienökonomik; AT&T Time Warner; Google Android;
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