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Fiscal implications of central bank balance sheet policies

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  • Orphanides, Athanasios

Abstract

Under ordinary circumstances, the fiscal implications of central bank policies tend to be seen as relatively minor and escape close scrutiny. The global financial crisis of 2008, however, demanded an extraordinary response by central banks which brought to light the immense power of central bank balance sheet policies as well as their major fiscal implications. Once the zero lower bound on interest rates is reached, expanding a central bank's balance sheet becomes the central instrument for providing additional monetary policy accommodation. However, with interest rates near zero, the line separating fiscal and monetary policy is blurred. Furthermore, discretionary decisions associated with asset purchases and liquidity provision, as well as with lender-of-last-resort operations benefiting private entities, can have major distributional effects that are ordinarily associated with fiscal policy. In the euro area, discretionary central bank decisions can have immense distributional effects across member states. However, decisions of this nature are incompatible with the role of unelected officials in democratic societies. Drawing on the response to the crisis by the Federal Reserve and the ECB, this paper explores the tensions arising from central bank balance sheet policies and addresses pertinent questions about the governance and accountability of independent central banks in a democratic society.

Suggested Citation

  • Orphanides, Athanasios, 2016. "Fiscal implications of central bank balance sheet policies," IMFS Working Paper Series 105, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:imfswp:105
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles WYPLOSZ, 2014. "The Eurozone crisis: A near-perfect case of mismanagement," Economia Marche / Journal of Applied Economics, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I) / Fondazione Aristide Merloni (I), vol. 0(1), pages 1-13, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael D. Bordo, 2017. "An Historical Perspective on the Quest for Financial Stability and the Monetary Policy Regime," Economics Working Papers 17108, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
    2. Athanasios Orphanides, 2020. "The fiscal–monetary policy mix in the euro area: challenges at the zero lower bound," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 35(103), pages 461-517.
    3. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    4. Hachula, Michael & Piffer, Michele & Rieth, Malte, 2020. "Unconventional Monetary Policy, Fiscal Side Effects and Euro Area (Im)balances," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 18(1), pages 202-231.
    5. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    6. Goodhart, C. A. E. & Masciandaro, Donato & Ugolini, Stefano, 2021. "Pandemic recession, helicopter money and central banking: Venice, 1630," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 108555, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. van Riet, Ad, 2017. "Monetary Policy Stretched to the Limit: How Could Governments Support the European Central Bank?," MPRA Paper 83451, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Orphanides, Athanasios, 2017. "Central Bank Policies and the Debt Trap," CEPR Discussion Papers 11834, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Masciandaro, Donato & Goodhart, Charles & Ugolini, Stefano, 2021. "Pandemic recession and helicopter money: Venice, 1629–1631," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(3), pages 300-318, December.
    10. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    11. Gros, Daniel, 2017. "Tightening by Stealth: Why keeping the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve constant is equivalent to a gradual exit," CEPS Papers 12652, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    12. Peter Spahn, 2016. "Central Bank Design in a Non-optimal Currency Union A Lender of Last Resort for Government Debt?," ROME Working Papers 201610, ROME Network.
    13. Gros, Daniel, 2017. "Implications of the Expanding Use of Cash for Monetary Policy," CEPS Papers 12661, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    14. Carolin Schellhorn, 2020. "Financial System Stability, the Timing of Climate Change Action and the Federal Reserve," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 9(3), pages 45-59.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    quantitative easing; lender of last resort; monetary financing; loss sharing; central bank independence; central bank accountability; central bank governance; rules vs discretion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management

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