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Central Bank Policies and the Debt Trap

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  • Orphanides, Athanasios

Abstract

Monetary policy and fiscal dynamics are inexorably linked. When a government faces the risk of getting caught in a high debt trap, debt monetization may become an appealing option. However, independent central banks may be able to allay debt concerns without compromising price stability. One option is financial repression which, despite associated distortions, can create some fiscal space while preserving price stability. Financial repression is a feature of quantitative easing, which has proven to be an effective policy tool at the zero lower bound. This paper examines the policies of the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan and the ECB in relation to debt dynamics for the United States, Japan, Germany and Italy since the crisis. Important differences are identified across the four states, reflecting differences in the policy choices of the three central banks. While decisive QE policies by the Federal Reserve and, more recently, by the Bank of Japan have been effective, ECB policies have had decidedly uneven consequences on Germany and Italy. The normalization of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet is also discussed in a historical context.

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  • Orphanides, Athanasios, 2017. "Central Bank Policies and the Debt Trap," CEPR Discussion Papers 11834, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11834
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Raffaella Barone & Donato Masciandaro, 2017. "Crime, Money Laundering, And Credit Markets: Can Usury Exist At The Zero Lower Bound?," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1761, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Alogoskoufis, George & Gravas, Konstantinos & Jacque, Laurent, 2023. "Asymmetries in post-war monetary arrangements in Europe: From Bretton Woods to the Euro Area," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 28(C).
    4. Tomasz Łyziak & Joanna Mackiewicz-Łyziak, 2019. "Sustainability of Public Finances in European Economies: Fiscal Policy Reactions and Market Pricing," Eastern European Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 57(1), pages 3-19, January.
    5. Raffaella Barone & Donato Masciandaro, 2019. "Cryptocurrency or usury? Crime and alternative money laundering techniques," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 233-254, April.
    6. Çakmaklı, Cem & Demiralp, Selva & Özcan, Şebnem Kalemli & Yeşiltaş, Sevcan & Yıldırım, Muhammed A., 2023. "COVID-19 and emerging markets: A SIR model, demand shocks and capital flows," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    7. Atsushi Tanaka, 2020. "Central Bank Capital and Credibility: A Literature Survey," Discussion Paper Series 208, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised May 2020.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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