IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/yor/yorken/09-07.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Conditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities

Author

Listed:
  • Stefania Borla
  • Peter Simmons

Abstract

We take a general model of externalities matching the Cooper & John framework with identical agents. If each agent's payoff depends on a parameter interpreted as the favourableness of the environment, we explore how the number of Nash equilibria varies with this parameter, especially in the cases in which the reaction curves are either concave or convex. In many examples the environmental conditions are themselves endogenous because either market or regulatory forces interact with agents' Nash equilibrium actions. This gives the idea of a simultaneous equilibrium in the environment and players' symmetric actions. We analyse how this generalised equilibrium behaves as a function of some additional parameters conditioning the environmental response to players actions. We show that generally there is a fold bifurcation in these equilibria. We illustrate the principles with two examples from industrial economics (cost spillovers between firms and demand spillovers under imperfect competition).

Suggested Citation

  • Stefania Borla & Peter Simmons, 2009. "Conditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities," Discussion Papers 09/07, Department of Economics, University of York.
    • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:09/07
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/discussionpapers/2009/0907.pdf
    File Function: Main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Echenique, Federico & Sabarwal, Tarun, 2003. "Strong comparative statics of equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 307-314, February.
    2. Russell Cooper & Andrew John, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(3), pages 441-463.
    3. Xavier Vives, 2007. "Games of strategic complementarities: an application to Bayesian games," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 237-247, December.
    4. Balasko, Yves, 1992. "The set of regular equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-8, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Federico Echenique, 2002. "Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 833-844, March.
    2. Bill Dupor, 2005. "Keynesian Conundrum: Multiplicity and Time Consistent Stabilization," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(1), pages 154-177, January.
    3. Antonio Cabrales & Rosemarie Nagel & Roc Armenter, 2007. "Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 221-234, September.
    4. James Bland & Nikos Nikiforakis, 2013. "Tacit Coordination in Games with Third-Party Externalities," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_19, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    5. Lau, Sau-Him Paul, 2001. "Aggregate Pattern of Time-dependent Adjustment Rules, II: Strategic Complementarity and Endogenous Nonsynchronization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 199-231, June.
    6. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2005:i:7:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Elvio Accinelli & Juan Gabriel Brida, 2007. "Modelos económicos con múltiples regímenes," Revista de Administración, Finanzas y Economía (Journal of Management, Finance and Economics), Tecnológico de Monterrey, Campus Ciudad de México, vol. 1(2), pages 96-115.
    8. Guido Friebel & Matthias Heinz & Miriam Krueger & Nikolay Zubanov, 2017. "Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(8), pages 2168-2203, August.
    9. Steven N. Durlauf, 1996. "Statistical Mechanics Approaches to Socioeconomic Behavior," NBER Technical Working Papers 0203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2005. "Government policy and the probability of coordination failures," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 939-973, May.
    11. Evans, Geroge W & Honkapohja, Seppo & Romer, Paul, 1998. "Growth Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 495-515, June.
    12. Sniekers, F.J.T., 2013. "Endogenous Beveridge cycles and the volatility of unemployment," CeNDEF Working Papers 13-12, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
    13. Di Bella, Gabriel & Grigoli, Francesco, 2019. "Optimism, pessimism, and short-term fluctuations," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 79-96.
    14. Salas Sergio & Nuñez Javier, 2020. "Signaling in monetary policy near the zero lower bound," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-19, January.
    15. Hyun Park & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Vangelis Vassilatos, 2003. "On the Optimal Size of Public Sector under Rent-Seeking competition from State Coffers," CESifo Working Paper Series 991, CESifo.
    16. Corneo, Giacomo, 2005. "Work and television," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 99-113, March.
    17. Donald R. Davis & David E. Weinstein, 2008. "A Search For Multiple Equilibria In Urban Industrial Structure," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 29-65, February.
    18. Marcello Basili & Stefano Dalle Mura, 2004. "Ambiguity and macroeconomics:a rationale for price stickiness," Department of Economics University of Siena 428, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    19. Michael T. Kiley, 1997. "Staggered price setting and real rigidities," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-46, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    20. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2015. "Macro-expérimentation autour des fonctions des banques centrales," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(2), pages 3-47.
    21. Abderrahmane ZIAD & Emmanuelle TAUGOURDEAU, 2011. "Fiscal Policies and Trade: On the existence of Nash equilibria," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201112, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    cost spillovers; Nash and Market equilibrium; coordination failure.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:09/07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Paul Hodgson (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deyoruk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.