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Can latent groups influence policy decisions? The case of telecommunications policy

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  • Dino Falaschetti

Abstract

Electoral constituencies recognize favorable policy outcomes in high- turnout jurisdictions (Key 1984 [1949]; Hamilton 1993; Fleck 1999). In the present paper, I evaluate whether underlying institutions might provide a finer explanation of this relationship. To do so, I formally examine variation in telecommunications policy across US states. The resulting evidence is consistent with residential customers recognizing more favorable policy when institutions reduce voting’s resource cost (measured by registration rules) or increase its non-pecuniary benefit (measured by Perot-support). Measures of either force explain significantly more variation in the present data than does a measure of actual participation (i.e., turnout).

Suggested Citation

  • Dino Falaschetti, 2003. "Can latent groups influence policy decisions? The case of telecommunications policy," Public Economics 0311002, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0311002
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on WinXP; pages: 23
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert G. Harris & C. Jeffrey Kraft, 1997. "Meddling Through: Regulating Local Telephone Competition in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 93-112, Fall.
    2. Kaserman, David L & Mayo, John W & Flynn, Joseph E, 1990. "Cross-Subsidization in Telecommunications: Beyond the Universal Service Fairy Tale," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 231-249, September.
    3. James T. Hamilton, 1993. "Politics and Social Costs: Estimating the Impact of Collective Action on Hazardous Waste Facilities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 101-125, Spring.
    4. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
    5. Angrist, Joshua D & Krueger, Alan B, 1995. "Split-Sample Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Return to Schooling," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 13(2), pages 225-235, April.
    6. Fleck, Robert K, 1999. "The Value of the Vote: A Model and Test of the Effects of Turnout on Distributive Policy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(4), pages 609-623, October.
    7. Globerman, Steven & Kadonaga, Daryl, 1994. "International Differences in Telephone Rate Structures and the Organization of Business Subscribers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 80(1-2), pages 129-142, July.
    8. Joshua D. Angrist & Alan B. Krueger, 1993. "Split Sample Instrumental Variables," Working Papers 699, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:80:y:1986:i:01:p:89-106_18 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Jacob L. Vigdor, 2004. "Community Composition and Collective Action: Analyzing Initial Mail Response to the 2000 Census," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(1), pages 303-312, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yusaku Horichi & Jun Saito, 2009. "Rain, Elections and Money: The Impact of Voter Turnout on Distributive Policy Outcomes in Japan," Asia Pacific Economic Papers 379, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    voter turnout; regulated prices; collective action;

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

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