Labor Rents, Ajustment Costs, and the Cost of U.S. Steel Trade Restraints in the 1980s
Recent studies have compared labor losses in import-competing industries with the costs of protection and found that those losses are not large enough to justify trade restraints. This study develops a new technique for estimating the costs and benefits of protection and provides a complete accounting of labor losses related to imports, including labor rents, unemployment costs and labor force dropouts. We find that a small steel tariff or auction quota could have generated net welfare gains for the U.S. in the 1980s, even though actual protection through Voluntary Restraint Agreements generated net welfare losses.
|Date of creation:||15 Apr 1996|
|Date of revision:||25 Apr 1996|
|Note:||Type of Document - WordPerfect; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP; pages: 32 ; figures: included|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://220.127.116.11|
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