Unequal Exchange: Developing Countries in the International Trade Negotiations
The results of the Uruguay Round, show that the concessions given by developing countries were generally more valuable than those they received from industrial countries. I suggest that this outcome is explained by aggressive demands from industrial countries, and by the lack of resources at the disposal of developing countries. These and other “structural factors”, weaken the negotiating capacity of developing countries and the outcome of their bargaining, is likely to be an “unequal exchange of concessions”. The paper discussess the costs of these exchanges, and the structural factors that help to understand the processes leading to these outcomes.
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- Martin, W. & Winters, L.A., 1995. "The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries," World Bank - Discussion Papers 307, World Bank.
- J. Michael Finger & Julio J. Nogués, 2005.
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- Finger, Michael J. & Schuler, Philip, 1999. "Implementation of Ururguay Round commitments : the development challenge," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2215, The World Bank.
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