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Albanian Political-Economics: Albanian Political-Economics: Consequences of a Clan Culture

Author

Listed:
  • Klarita Gërxhani

    (University of Amsterdam, Institute for Advanced Labour Studies AIAS , Amsterdam School for Social science Research ASSR , Faculty of Economics & Econometrics FEE)

  • Arthur Schram

    (University of Amsterdam, CREED, Faculty of Economics & Econometrics)

Abstract

We study the politico-economic interaction in a country in transition from a communist regime to a democratic, free market system, to wit, Albania. It is argued that the politico-economic system there is characterized by the existence of clans. Both the communists and the first democratically chosen government applied policies that favored specific clans. Moreover, a popularity function estimation shows that voters related to different clans react in a distinct way to party policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Klarita Gërxhani & Arthur Schram, 2004. "Albanian Political-Economics: Albanian Political-Economics: Consequences of a Clan Culture," Development and Comp Systems 0404009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0404009
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 22
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Myerson, Roger B., 1993. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(4), pages 856-869, December.
    2. Dewatripont, Mathias & Roland, Gerard, 1995. "The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1207-1223, December.
    3. Hobdari, Bersant, 1998. "Labor Market and Regional Differences in Unemployment in Albania," East European Series 53, Institute for Advanced Studies.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • O52 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Europe

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