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Community Based Targeting for Social Safety Nets

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Abstract

This paper interprets case studies and theory on community involvement in beneficiary selection and benefit delivery for social safety nets. Several considerations should be carefully balanced in assessing the advantages of using community groups as targeting agents. First, benefits from utilizing local information and social capital may be eroded by costly rent-seeking. Second, the potential improvement in targeting criteria from incorporating local notions of deprivation must be tempered by the possibility of program capture by local elites, and by the possibility that local preferences are not pro-poor. Third, performance may be undermined by unforeseen strategic targeting by local communities in response to national funding and evaluation criteria, or by declines in political support.

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  • Jonathan Conning & Michael Kevane, 2000. "Community Based Targeting for Social Safety Nets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2000-09, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  • Handle: RePEc:wil:wileco:2000-09
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1999. "Social relations and cooperation in organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-25, January.
    2. Echeverri-Gent, John, 1992. "Public participation and poverty alleviation: The experience of reform communists in India's West Bengal," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 20(10), pages 1401-1422, October.
    3. Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 1998. "The political economy of targeting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 177-200, April.
    4. Ravallion, Martin & Wodon, Quentin, 1998. "Evaluating a targeted social program when placement is decentralized," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1945, The World Bank.
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    Cited by:

    1. Neha Kumar, 2007. "Pro-Poor Targeting and Participatory Governance: Evidence from Central India," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-176, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    2. Jha, Raghbendra & Bhattacharyya, Sambit & Gaiha, Raghav & Shankar, Shylashri, 2009. ""Capture" of anti-poverty programs: An analysis of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program in India," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 456-464, September.
    3. Muhammad Haseeb & Kate Vyborny, 2016. "Imposing institutions: Evidence from cash transfer reform in Pakistan," CSAE Working Paper Series 2016-36, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    4. World Bank, 2002. "Sri Lanka : Poverty Assessment," World Bank Publications - Reports 15387, The World Bank Group.

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