IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Good countries or good projects ? macro and micro correlates of World Bank project performance

  • Denizer, Cevdet
  • Kaufmann, Daniel
  • Kraay, Aart

The authors use data from more than 6,000 World Bank projects evaluated between 1983 and 2009 to investigate macro and micro correlates of project outcomes. They find that country-level"macro"measures of the quality of policies and institutions are very strongly correlated with project outcomes, confirming the importance of country-level performance for the effective use of aid resources. However, a striking feature of the data is that the success of individual development projects varies much more within countries than it does between countries. The authors assemble a large set of project-level"micro"correlates of project outcomes in an effort to explain some of this within-country variation. They find that measures of project size, the extent of project supervision, and evaluation lags are all significantly correlated with project outcomes, as are early-warning indicators that flag problematic projects during the implementation stage. They also find that measures of World Bank project task manager quality matter significantly for the ultimate outcome of projects. They discuss the implications of these findings for donor policies aimed at aid effectiveness.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/05/02/000158349_20110502085201/Rendered/PDF/WPS5646.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 5646.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 01 May 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5646
Contact details of provider: Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Hristos Doucouliagos & Martin Paldam, 2009. "The Aid Effectiveness Literature: The Sad Results Of 40 Years Of Research," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 433-461, 07.
  2. Clausen, Bianca & Kraay, Aart & Murrell, Peter, 2010. "Does respondent reticence affect the results of corruption surveys ? evidence from the world bank enterprise survey for Nigeria," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5415, The World Bank.
  3. Michael Clemens & Steven Radelet & Rikhil Bhavnani, 2004. "Counting Chickens When They Hatch: The Short-term Effect of Aid on Growth," Working Papers 44, Center for Global Development.
  4. Dollar, David & Svensson, Jakob, 1998. "What explains the success or failure of structural adjustment programs?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1938, The World Bank.
  5. Kilby, C., 1995. "Supervision and Performance : The Case of World Bank Projects," Discussion Paper 1995-45, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. Rachid LAAJAJ & Patrick GUILLAUMONT, 2006. "When instability increases the effectiveness of aid projects," Working Papers 200637, CERDI.
  7. Wane, Waly, 2004. "The quality of foreign aid : country selectivity or donors incentives?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3325, The World Bank.
  8. Jan F. Kiviet, 2013. "Identification and inference in a simultaneous equation under alternative information sets and sampling schemes," Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 16(1), pages S24-S59, 02.
  9. Olken, Benjamin A., 2009. "Corruption perceptions vs. corruption reality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 950-964, August.
  10. Kilby, Christopher, 2013. "The political economy of project preparation: An empirical analysis of World Bank projects," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 211-225.
  11. Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Who Must Pay Bribes And How Much? Evidence From A Cross Section Of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 207-230, February.
  12. Arndt Channing & Jones Sam & Tarp Finn, 2010. "Aid, Growth, and Development: Have We Come Full Circle?," Journal of Globalization and Development, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2), pages 1-29, December.
  13. Hansen, Henrik & Tarp, Finn, 1999. "Aid Effectiveness Disputed," MPRA Paper 62290, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Raghuram G. Rajan, 2005. "Aid and Growth: What Does The Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?," Working Papers id:54, eSocialSciences.
  15. Isham, Jonathan & Kaufmann, Daniel & Pritchett, Lant H, 1997. "Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the Performance of Government Projects," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 11(2), pages 219-42, May.
  16. Sanjay G. Reddy & Camelia Minoiu, 2006. "Development Aid and Economic Growth: A Positive Long-Run Relation," Working Papers 29, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.
  17. World Bank, 2010. "Cost-Benefit Analysis in World Bank Projects," World Bank Other Operational Studies 10481, The World Bank.
  18. Michael A. Clemens & Steven Radelet & Rikhil R. Bhavnani & Samuel Bazzi, 2012. "Counting Chickens when they Hatch: Timing and the Effects of Aid on Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(561), pages 590-617, 06.
  19. William Easterly & Ross Levine & David Roodman, 2004. "Aid, Policies, and Growth: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 774-780, June.
  20. Patrick Guillaumont & Rachid Laajaj, 2011. "When instability increases the effectiveness of aid projects," Working Papers halshs-00557176, HAL.
  21. Chauvet, Lisa & Collier, Paul & Duponchel, Marguerite, 2010. "What explains aid project success in post-conflict situations ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5418, The World Bank.
  22. Burnside, Craig & Dollar, David, 1997. "Aid, policies, and growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1777, The World Bank.
  23. Khwaja, Asim Ijaz, 2009. "Can good projects succeed in bad communities?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 899-916, August.
  24. David Roodman, 2007. "The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development, and Cross-Country Empirics," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 21(2), pages 255-277, May.
  25. Axel Dreher & Stephan Klasen & James Raymond Vreeland & Eric Werker, 2010. "The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically-driven Aid less Effective?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2993, CESifo Group Munich.
  26. Aart Kraay, 2012. "Instrumental variables regressions with uncertain exclusion restrictions: a Bayesian approach," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(1), pages 108-128, 01.
  27. Christopher Kilby, 2012. "Assessing the contribution of donor agencies to aid effectiveness: The impact of World Bank preparation on project outcomes," Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series 20, Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics.
  28. Temple, Jonathan R.W., 2010. "Aid and Conditionality," Handbook of Development Economics, Elsevier.
  29. Deininger, Klaus & Squire, Lyn & Basu, Swati, 1998. "Does Economic Analysis Improve the Quality of Foreign Assistance?," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 12(3), pages 385-418, September.
  30. Erick Gong, 2011. "HIV Testing and Risky Sexual Behavior," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 1101, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  31. Dollar, David & Levin, Victoria, 2005. "Sowing and reaping: institutional quality and project outcomes in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3524, The World Bank.
  32. Isham, Jonathan & Kaufmann,Daniel, 1995. "The forgotten rationale for policy reform : the productivity of investment projects," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1549, The World Bank.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5646. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.