IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Free trade and deep integration : antidumping and antitrust in regional agreements

  • Hoekman, Bernard

Preferential trading agreements (PTAs) are increasingly including elements of"deep"integration--efforts to agree on common regulatory regimes. The author explores what the PTA experience suggests about the relationship between shallow integration--attaining unconditional intra-area free trade (including the abolition of antidumping)--and deeper integration, especially agreement about common antitrust rules. He argues that common antitrust disciplines in PTAs tend to be driven by a broader agenda--which revolves around attaining economic integration (for example, by creating a single market), not by a need to abolish antidumping. Many PTAs continue to apply antidumping to internal trade flows. In practice, it may be that the demise of antidumping in PTAs is constrained because governments are concerned about the potential for their partners to engage in beggar-thy-neighbor industrial policies. They may consider antidumping a useful defensive instrument in this connection, as it can substitute for instruments such as countervailing duties, which have a much higher foreign policy content andmay be more difficult to pursue. If so, antidumping is a particularly ineffective and costly instrument. Eliminating it in PTAs would help focus attention on the real source of trade problems (industrial policies and government interventions) rather than on the symptoms (allegations of unfair dumping).

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1998/07/01/000009265_3980928162543/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 1950.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 31 Jul 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1950
Contact details of provider: Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Collie, D., 1990. "Export Subsidies And Countervailing Tariffs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 353, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  2. Togan, Sübidey, 1997. "Opening up the Turkish Economy in the Context of the Customs Union with EU," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 12, pages 157-179.
  3. Veugelers, Reinhilde & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 1999. "European anti-dumping policy and the profitability of national and international collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-28, January.
  4. Barros, Pedro P. & Cabral, Luis, 1994. "Merger policy in open economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1041-1055, May.
  5. Barros, Pedro Luis Pita & Mata, José, 1996. "Competition Policy in Portugal," CEPR Discussion Papers 1441, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Horn, H. & Levinsohn, J., 1998. "Merger Policies and Trade Liberalization," Working Papers 420, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
  7. Hoekman, Bernard M. & Leidy, Michael P., 1992. "Cascading contingent protection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 883-892, May.
  8. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1990. "The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopoly," NBER Working Papers 3254, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Laird, Sam, 1997. "MERCOSUR: Objectives and achievements," WTO Staff Working Papers TPRD-97-02, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
  10. Reitzes, James D, 1993. "Antidumping Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(4), pages 745-63, November.
  11. Arvind Panagariya & Jagdish Bhagwati, 1996. "The Economics of Preferential Trade Agreements," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 51856, 4.
  12. Bernard Hoekman, 1997. "Competition Policy and the Global Trading System," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(4), pages 383-406, 07.
  13. David R. Collie, 2003. "Mergers and Trade Policy under Oligopoly," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), pages 55-71, February.
  14. Michael P. Leidy, 1997. "Macroeconomic Conditions and Pressures for Protection under Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws: Empirical Evidence from the United States," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 44(1), pages 132-144, March.
  15. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1989. "Strategic Use of Antidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusion," NBER Working Papers 3016, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Pittman, R., 1997. "Competition Law in Central Eastern Europe: Five Years Later," Papers 97-2, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
  17. Hoekman, Bernard, 1996. "Trade and Competition Policy in the WTO system," CEPR Discussion Papers 1501, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. Rowat, M. & Lubrano, M. & Porrata, R.Jr., 1997. "Competition Policy and MERCOSUR," Papers 385, World Bank - Technical Papers.
  19. Massimo Motta & Fabrizio Onida, 1997. "Trade Policy and Competition Policy," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 56(1-2), pages 67-97, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1950. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.