Power and the Analysis of the Food System
This paper stresses that in order to understand the current restructuring processes in the food system it is necessary to take explicitly into account the role of power as a driving organizational force. Agricultural economics, drawing pervasively on the walrasian model, has mainly analysed power in the form of market and bargaining power. Stemming from different definitions of power, the paper focuses on some definitions suggested by the new institutional economics and the network theory, showing their relevance to the analysis of the food market
|Date of creation:||Apr 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.deps.unisi.it/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pol Antras & Elhanan Helpman, 2003.
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
2005, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Pol Antràs & Elhanan Helpman, 2003. "Global Sourcing," NBER Working Papers 10082, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Antràs, Pol & Helpman, Elhanan, 2004. "Global Sourcing," CEPR Discussion Papers 4170, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Antras, Pol & Helpman, Elhanan, 2004. "Global Sourcing," Scholarly Articles 3196327, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 1993. "The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 83-102, Winter.
- Stephen F. Hamilton, 2003. "Slotting Allowances as a Facilitating Practice by Food Processors in Wholesale Grocery Markets: Profitability and Welfare Effects," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 85(4), pages 797-813.
- Robert C. Feenstra & Gordon H. Hanson, 2004.
"Ownership and Control in Outsourcing to China: Estimating the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm,"
NBER Working Papers
10198, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985.
"The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
- Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Hart, Oliver D, 1988.
"Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 119-39, Spring.
- repec:hrv:faseco:4784029 is not listed on IDEAS
- Rothschild, Kurt W., 2002. "The absence of power in contemporary economic theory," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 433-442.
- Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, 2000. "Networks versus Vertical Integration," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(3), pages 570-601, Autumn.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:478. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fabrizio Becatti)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.