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Listening Without Understanding: Central Bank Transparency, Financial Markets and the Crowding Out of Private Information

Author

Listed:
  • C.J.M. Kool
  • S. Rosenkranz
  • M. Middeldorp

Abstract

The trend of monetary policy transparency has recently extended itself to the practice of providing guidance on the likely direction of policy rates. There is a risk that communicating the central bank’s own outlook for interest rates actually undermines the financial markets’ ability to predict monetary policy. This paper analyzes this risk using the Diamond (1985) model of a financial market, which includes both costly private information acquisition and a costless public signal. We demonstrate that a sufficiently precise signal from the central bank can result in a deterioration of the financial market’s ability to predict monetary policy through the crowding out of private information acquisition. Central banks could alleviate this risk with a policy of limiting the guidance offered to the financial market in order to leave sufficient scope for private information acquisition.

Suggested Citation

  • C.J.M. Kool & S. Rosenkranz & M. Middeldorp, 2007. "Listening Without Understanding: Central Bank Transparency, Financial Markets and the Crowding Out of Private Information," Working Papers 07-19, Utrecht School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:0719
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. M. Middeldorp & S. Rosenkranz, 2008. "Information acquisition in an experimental asset market," Working Papers 08-25, Utrecht School of Economics.
    2. repec:use:tkiwps:2525 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:use:tkiwps:2626 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. M. Middeldorp & S. Rosenkranz, 2008. "Central bank communication and crowding out of private information in an experimental asset market," Working Papers 08-26, Utrecht School of Economics.

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    Keywords

    Interest Rates; Monetary Policy; Information and Financial Market Efficiency; Communication; Transparency; Information Acquisition;
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