IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/dnb/dnbwpp/080.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Costs of Increasing Transparency

Author

Listed:
  • Maria Demertzis
  • Marco Hoeberichts

Abstract

In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin (2002a) argued that increasing the precision of public information is not always bene.cial to social welfare. Svensson (2005) however has disputed this by saying that although feasible, the conditions for which this was true, were not at all that likely. In that respect, therefore, increasing transparency remains most of the times beneficial to social welfare. In this paper, we extend the Morris and Shin attempt, by setting it up as an explicit interactive game between the Central Bank, the objectives of which we model explicitly, and the private sector. We show that in the absence of costs, both players benefit from transparency, in the manner described previously in the literature, and point the di¤erences in their gains. Following that, we then introduce the fact that increasing transparency comes at some costs, and show how both players face incentives to free ride on each other as a result. The presence of costs, thus alters the way in which greater transparency is attained.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Demertzis & Marco Hoeberichts, 2006. "The Costs of Increasing Transparency," DNB Working Papers 080, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:080
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.dnb.nl/binaries/Working%20Paper%2080_tcm46-146737.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Antonio Fatás & Ilian Mihov & Andrew K. Rose, 2007. "Quantitative Goals for Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(5), pages 1163-1176, August.
    2. Jeffery D. Amato & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Communication and Monetary Policy," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 495-503.
    3. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 91-98, May.
    4. Maria Demertzis & Nicola Viegi, 2008. "Inflation Targets as Focal Points," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(1), pages 55-87, March.
    5. Michael Woodford, 2001. "Imperfect Common Knowledge and the Effects of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 8673, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Orphanides, Athanasios & Williams, John C., 2005. "The decline of activist stabilization policy: Natural rate misperceptions, learning, and expectations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 1927-1950, November.
    7. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1999. "Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 607-654, June.
    8. Hyun Song Shin & Jeffery D. Amato, 2003. "Public and private information in monetary policy models," BIS Working Papers 138, Bank for International Settlements.
    9. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2001.
    10. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. C.J.M. Kool & S. Rosenkranz & M. Middeldorp, 2007. "Listening Without Understanding : Central Bank Transparency, Financial Markets and the Crowding Out of Private Information," Working Papers 07-19, Utrecht School of Economics.
    2. van der Cruijsen, Carin A.B. & Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Hoogduin, Lex H., 2010. "Optimal central bank transparency," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(8), pages 1482-1507, December.
    3. Maria Demertzis, 2009. "The 'Wisdom of the Crowds' and Public Policy," DNB Working Papers 203, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    4. Bryan Chapple, 2006. "Monetary policy strategies and credibility - theory and practice," DNB Occasional Studies 404, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    5. Maria Demertzis, 2006. "The Role of Expectations in Monetary Policy," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 393-412, December.
    6. M.H. Middeldorp, 2011. "FOMC Communication Policy and the Accuracy of Fed Funds Futures," Working Papers 11-13, Utrecht School of Economics.
    7. M. Middeldorp, 2011. "Central Bank Transparency, the Accuracy of Professional Forecasts, and Interest Rate Volatility," Working Papers 11-12, Utrecht School of Economics.
    8. van Holle, Frederiek, 2017. "Essays in empirical finance and monetary policy," Other publications TiSEM 30d11a4b-7bc9-4c81-ad24-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2005. "Forming Rational Expectations and When it is Right to be 'Wrong'," CEPR Discussion Papers 5042, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Ma, Yong & Li, Shushu, 2015. "Bayesian estimation of China's monetary policy transparency: A New Keynesian approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 236-248.
    11. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B. & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency : A Survey," Discussion Paper 2007-06, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    12. Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2008. "Asymmetric information and rational expectations: When is it right to be "wrong"?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(8), pages 1407-1419, December.
    13. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B., 2008. "The economic impact of central bank transparency," Other publications TiSEM 86c1ba91-1952-45b4-adac-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public and Private Signals; High Order Expectations; Monetary Policy.;

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:080. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rob Vet). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/dnbgvnl.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.