IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/feddwp/00-02.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On Fed watching and central bank transparency in an overlapping generations model

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph H. Haslag

Abstract

I develop a simple general equilibrium model that integrates fed watching with central bank opaqueness. With the intergenerational conflict, opaqueness can solve a Ramsey problem. With monetary uncertainty as the only source of randomness, transparency is the welfare maximizing policy. With other sources of variation, transparency is costly in the sense that it limits the central bank?s response to intrinsic shocks. In short, opaqueness is the veil that permits the central bank freedom to choose money growth in a way to raise welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph H. Haslag, 2000. "On Fed watching and central bank transparency in an overlapping generations model," Working Papers 0002, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:feddwp:00-02
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.dallasfed.org/~/media/documents/research/papers/2000/wp0002.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rudin, Jeremy R., 1988. "Central bank secrecy, `fed watching', and the predictability of interest rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 317-334, September.
    2. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    3. Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2002. "The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(2), pages 520-539, May.
    4. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
    5. William Poole, 1969. "Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a simple stochastic macro model," Special Studies Papers 2, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2001. "On the optimality of transparent monetary policy," Working Papers 613, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    7. Balke, Nathan S & Haslag, Joseph H, 1992. "A Theory of Fed Watching in a Macroeconomic Policy Game," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(3), pages 619-628, August.
    8. A. Sandmo, 1970. "The Effect of Uncertainty on Saving Decisions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 37(3), pages 353-360.
    9. Carlstrom, Charles T. & Fuerst, Timothy S., 1995. "Interest rate rules vs. money growth rules a welfare comparison in a cash-in-advance economy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 247-267, November.
    10. Goodfriend, Marvin, 1986. "Monetary mystique: Secrecy and central banking," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 63-92, January.
    11. Helpman, Elhanan & Sadka, Efraim, 1979. "Optimal Financing of the Government's Budget: Taxes, Bonds, or Money?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 152-160, March.
    12. David Cass & Menahem E. Yaari, 1966. "A Re-examination of the Pure Consumption Loans Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(4), pages 353-353.
    13. Rebelo, Sergio & Xie, Danyang, 1999. "On the optimality of interest rate smoothing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 263-282, April.
    14. Cosimano, Thomas F & Van Huyck, John B, 1993. "Central Bank Secrecy, Interest Rates, and Monetary Control," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(3), pages 370-382, July.
    15. Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Secrecy of Monetary Policy and the Variability of Interest Rates," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(4), pages 425-436, November.
    16. Bertocchi, Graziella & Wang, Yong, 1996. "Imperfect Information, Bayesian Learning, and Capital Accumulation," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 487-503, December.
    17. Bryant, John & Wallace, Neil, 1980. "Open-Market Operations in a Model of Regulated, Insured Intermediaries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(1), pages 146-173, February.
    18. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
    19. Hadar, Josef & Russell, William R, 1969. "Rules for Ordering Uncertain Prospects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 25-34, March.
    20. William Poole, 1970. "Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Stochastic Macro Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(2), pages 197-216.
    21. Dotsey, Michael, 1987. "Monetary policy, secrecy, and federal funds rate behavior," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 463-474, December.
    22. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Patron, Hilde, 2007. "The value of information about central bankers' preferences," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 139-148.
    2. cho, hyejin, 2014. "bank capital regulation model," MPRA Paper 54409, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B., 2008. "The economic impact of central bank transparency," Other publications TiSEM 86c1ba91-1952-45b4-adac-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B. & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency : A Survey," Discussion Paper 2007-06, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Geraats, Petra M., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-21, March.
    4. Marc Tomljanovich, 2007. "Does Central Bank Transparency Impact Financial Markets? A Cross‐Country Econometric Analysis," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(3), pages 791-813, January.
    5. Seth B. Carpenter, 2004. "Transparency and monetary policy: what does the academic literature tell policymakers?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-35, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Akhand Akhtar Hossain, 2009. "Central Banking and Monetary Policy in the Asia-Pacific," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12777.
    7. Mariusz Jarmuzek & Lucjan T. Orlowski & Artur Radziwill, 2004. "Monetary Policy Transparency in Inflation Targeting Countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0281, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    8. Elmar Mertens, 2016. "Managing Beliefs about Monetary Policy under Discretion," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(4), pages 661-698, June.
    9. Andrew G Haldane & Vicky Read, 2000. "Monetary policy surprises and the yield curve," Bank of England working papers 106, Bank of England.
    10. Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2001. "On the optimality of transparent monetary policy," Working Papers 613, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    11. Kui-Wai Li, 2013. "The US monetary performance prior to the 2008 crisis," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(24), pages 3450-3461, August.
    12. Winkler, Bernhard, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 0026, European Central Bank.
    13. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5221 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Philippe Muller & Mark Zelmer, 1999. "Greater Transparency in Monetary Policy: Impact on Financial Markets," Technical Reports 86, Bank of Canada.
    15. Dale Henderson & Ning Zhu, 1990. "Uncertainty and the choice of instruments in a two-country monetary-policy game," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 39-65, February.
    16. Stephen J. Turnovsky, 2011. "Stabilization Theory and Policy: 50 Years after the Phillips Curve," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 78(309), pages 67-88, January.
    17. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    18. Andrew Hallett & Jan Libich, 2012. "Explicit inflation targets and central bank independence: friends or foes?," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 45(4), pages 271-297, November.
    19. Aleksandar Murdzhev & Marc Tomljanovich, 2006. "What Color is Alan Greenspan's Tie? How Central Bank Policy Announcements Have Changed Financial Markets," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(4), pages 571-593, Fall.
    20. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Oh, Seonghwan, 1995. "When and how much to talk credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 341-357, April.
    21. Canzoneri, Matthew B. & Dellas, Harris, 1998. "Real interest rates and central bank operating procedures," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 471-494, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:feddwp:00-02. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Amy Chapman (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbdaus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.