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Competition, innovation and growth with limited commitment

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  • Ramon Marimon
  • Vincenzo Quadrini

Abstract

We study how barriers to business start-up affect the investment in knowledge capital when contracts are not enforceable. Barriers to business start-up lower the competition for knowledge capital and, in absence of commitment, reduce the incentive to accumulate knowledge. As a result, countries with large barriers experience lower income and growth. Our results are consistent with cross-country evidence showing that the cost of business start-up is negatively correlated with the level and growth of income.

Suggested Citation

  • Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2005. "Competition, innovation and growth with limited commitment," Economics Working Papers 933, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:933
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicola Pavoni & Christopher Sleet & Matthias Messner, 2018. "The Dual Approach to Recursive Optimization: Theory and Examples," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(1), pages 133-172, January.
    2. Fernando Rio & Antonio Sampayo, 2017. "Complementarity, Linkages between Firms, and the Effect of Entry Costs on Productivity," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 1281-1304, November.
    3. Hernan Moscoso Boedo & Toshihiko Mukoyama, 2012. "Evaluating the effects of entry regulations and firing costs on international income differences," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 143-170, June.
    4. Messner Matthias & Pavoni Nicola & Sleet Christopher, "undated". "On the Dual Approach to Recursive Optimization," GSIA Working Papers 2012-E12, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    5. Commander, Simon & Svejnar, Jan & Tinn, Katrin, 2008. "Explaining the performance of firms and countries: What does the business environment play?," Working Papers 836, Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University.
    6. Commander, Simon & Nikoloski, Zlatko, 2010. "Institutions and Economic Performance: What Can Be Explained?," IZA Discussion Papers 5247, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Gao, Yanyan & Zang, Leizhen & Roth, Antoine & Wang, Puqu, 2017. "Does democracy cause innovation? An empirical test of the popper hypothesis," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(7), pages 1272-1283.
    8. Federico De Francesco, 2010. "Wage Inequality and Entrepreneurship," 2010 Meeting Papers 959, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Innovation; Knowledge Capital; Enforcement; Growth; Competition; Commitment; Recursive Contracts; Mobility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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