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Institutional Investors, Corporate Ownership, and Corporate Governance: Global Perspectives

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  • Gillan, Stuart L.
  • Starks, Laura T.

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  • Gillan, Stuart L. & Starks, Laura T., 2002. "Institutional Investors, Corporate Ownership, and Corporate Governance: Global Perspectives," WIDER Working Paper Series 009, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:dp2002-09
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    31. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1993. "Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 678-709, August.
    32. Simeon Djankov, 1999. "Ownership Structure and Enterprise Restructuring in Six Newly Independent States," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 41(1), pages 75-95, April.
    33. Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Malatesta, Paul H. & Walkling, Ralph A., 1996. "Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 365-395, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:touman:v:49:y:2015:i:c:p:87-96 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. De-la-Hoz, Maria Camila & Pombo, Carlos, 2016. "Institutional investor heterogeneity and firm valuation: Evidence from Latin America," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 197-221.
    3. Pedro Verga Matos & Miguel Coelho, 2016. "Short-Termism In Euronext Lisbon: An Empirical Analysis," Portuguese Journal of Management Studies, ISEG, Universidade de Lisboa, vol. 21(1), pages 49-76.
    4. Pombo, Carlos & De la hoz, María Camila, 2015. "Institutional Investors and Firm Valuation: Evidence from Latin America," Galeras. Working Papers Series 040, Universidad de Los Andes. Facultad de Administración. School of Management.

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