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Crony Capitalism: Caricature or Category?

  • Mazumdar, Surajit

This paper, part of a series on Crony Capitalism and Contemporary India, examines the conceptual meaning of the term crony capitalism, which has acquired considerable popularity since it was used as an explanation for the East Asian crisis. The paper argues that the conception of crony capitalism as a description of a distinct kind of capitalism associated with the State playing a key role in the allocation process suffers from serious deficiencies and therefore does not provide a suitable framework for understanding the business-state interaction. While the phenomenon that is called cronyism is very real, it is widespread in modern capitalism and not a peculiar feature of capitalism characterized by a particular economic policy regime. In fact, crony capitalism may lie at the very heart of the contemporary global capitalist order, and this crony capitalism may explain why the concept of crony capitalism has acquired such prominence in recent times

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 19626.

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Date of creation: Feb 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:19626
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  1. John Shuhe Li, 2003. "Relation-based versus Rule-based Governance: an Explanation of the East Asian Miracle and Asian Crisis," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(4), pages 651-673, 09.
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  10. repec:aea:jeclit:v:43:y:2005:i:3:p:655-720 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Clifford G. Holderness & Randall S. Kroszner & Dennis P. Sheehan, 1998. "Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression," NBER Working Papers 6550, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  13. Chad Leechor, 1999. "Reviving the Market for Corporate Control," World Bank Other Operational Studies 11463, The World Bank.
  14. Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein, 2005. "The Theory of the Firm and Its Critics A Stocktaking and Assessment," DRUID Working Papers 05-03, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
  15. Ajit Singh & Jack Glen & Ann Zammit & Rafael De-Hoyos & Alaka Singh & Bruce Weisse, 2005. "Shareholder Value Maximisation, Stock Market and New Technology: Should the US Corporate Model be the Universal Standard?," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(4), pages 419-437.
  16. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Zingales, Luigi, 2003. "The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 5-50, July.
  17. Michael Piore, 2002. "Economics and Sociology," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 53(2), pages 291-300.
  18. Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "The market for corporate control : The scientific evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 5-50, April.
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