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Deducing Varieties of Capitalism

  • Carney, Richard
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    One of the key criticisms made of the Varieties of Capitalism perspective advanced by Hall and Soskice (2001) is that it is functionalist. Here, I offer a deductive model of capitalism that is consistent with their framework. Specifically, I deduce the structure of nations' capitalist institutions based on distributive welfare gains to those actors representing an economy's main factors of production - land, labor, and capital. Based on the coalitions and political battles that may be fought among these actors, I derive seven capitalist ideal-types that fall along the LME-CME spectrum.

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    File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5145/1/MPRA_paper_5145.pdf
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    Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 5145.

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    Date of creation: 11 Sep 2007
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    Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5145
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    1. Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 689-721, August.
    2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-deSilanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2000. "Government Ownership of Banks," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1890, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    3. Myers, Stewart C, 1984. " The Capital Structure Puzzle," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(3), pages 575-92, July.
    4. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Kornai, J, 1979. "Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(4), pages 801-19, July.
    6. Hall, Peter A. & Soskice, David (ed.), 2001. "Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199247752, March.
    7. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    8. Myers, Stewart C., 1984. "Capital structure puzzle," Working papers 1548-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    9. Sigurt Vitols, 2005. "Changes in Germany's Bank-Based Financial System: implications for corporate governance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 386-396, 05.
    10. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November.
    11. Stewart C. Myers, 1984. "Capital Structure Puzzle," NBER Working Papers 1393, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
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