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Why Has There Been So Little Block Holding in America?

In: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers

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  • Marco Becht
  • J. Bradford DeLong

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Marco Becht & J. Bradford DeLong, 2005. "Why Has There Been So Little Block Holding in America?," NBER Chapters,in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 613-666 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:10278
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    Cited by:

    1. Randall Morck, 2011. "Finance and Governance in Developing Economies," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 375-406, December.
    2. Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2009. "Never Waste a Good Crisis: An Historical Perspective on Comparative Corporate Governance," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 145-179, November.
    3. Jürgen Wandel, 2011. "Business groups and competition in post-Soviet transition economies: The case of Russian “agroholdings”," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 24(4), pages 403-450, December.
    4. Henrekson, Magnus & Jakobsson, Ulf, 2011. "The Swedish Corporate Control Model: Convergence, Persistence or Decline?," Working Paper Series 857, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    5. Francesco Caselli & Nicola Gennaioli, 2013. "Dynastic Management," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 971-996, January.
    6. Randall Morck, 2005. "How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups The Double Taxation of Inter-corporate Dividends and other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy," NBER Chapters,in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 19, pages 135-179 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Randall Morck & Lloyd Steier, 2005. "The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction," NBER Chapters,in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 1-64 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Carney, Richard, 2007. "Farmers and Capitalism," MPRA Paper 5148, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Marianna Belloc & Ugo Pagano, 2008. "Politics-Business Interaction Paths," Working Papers 109, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
    10. Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala & Winnie Fung, 2005. "Taxation and the Evolution of Aggregate Corporate Ownership Concentration," NBER Working Papers 11469, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Hilt, Eric, 2008. "When did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(03), pages 645-685, September.
    12. Jean Helwege & Christo Pirinsky & René M. Stulz, 2007. "Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of the Dynamics of Corporate Ownership," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(3), pages 995-1028, June.
    13. Mazumdar, Surajit, 2008. "Crony Capitalism: Caricature or Category?," MPRA Paper 19626, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Yoser Gadhoum, 2006. "Power of Ultimate Controlling Owners: A Survey of Canadian Landscape," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 10(2), pages 179-204, May.
    15. Mario García Molina, 2011. "Esquema para el análisis de la estructura de un grupo económico," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO - ESCUELA DE ECONOMÍA 007957, UN - RCE - CID.
    16. Morck, Randall & Yeung, Bernard, 2004. "Special issues relating to corporate governance and family control," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3406, The World Bank.
    17. Leslie Hannah, 2007. "What did Morgan's Men really do?," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-465, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    18. Mario García Molina, 2010. "Crisis y diversificación de los grupos empresariales colombianos a finales de los noventa," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO - ESCUELA DE ECONOMÍA 007571, UN - RCE - CID.

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