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Esquema para el análisis de la estructura de un grupo económico

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  • Mario García Molina

Abstract

Se propone un marco para el análisis de la estructura de un grupo económico diversificado a partir de 6 áreas según la función de cada empresa dentro del grupo: fuentes de efectivo, firmas financieras (que facilitan el flujo de efectivo), firmas que permiten preservar la propiedad y el control de las demás, firmas con alta rentabilidad esperada, firmas con importancia política, y firmas con baja rentabilidad que no están en los grupos anteriores. El grupo está compuesto por una red de firmas ligada a otra de personas. El estudio del grupo es el estudio de la estructura, comportamiento y evolución de tales redes.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario García Molina, 2011. "Esquema para el análisis de la estructura de un grupo económico," Documentos de Trabajo, Escuela de Economía 7957, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000178:007957
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    File URL: http://www.fce.unal.edu.co/centro-editorial/docs/escuela-de-economia/21-esquema-para-el-analisis-de-la-estructura-de-un-grupo-economico
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Simon Johnson, 2000. "Tunneling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 22-27, May.
    2. L. Randall Wray, 2007. "Endogenous Money: Structuralist and Horizontalist," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_512, Levy Economics Institute.
    3. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    4. Thomas I. Palley, 2002. "Endogenous Money: What it is and Why it Matters," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 152-180, May.
    5. Marco Becht & J. Bradford DeLong, 2005. "Why Has There Been So Little Block Holding in America?," NBER Chapters, in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 613-666, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Randall K. Morck, 2005. "A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number morc05-1, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Grupos económicos; Conglomerados; Gobierno Corporativo;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance

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