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Corrupción, desigualdad y evasión de impuestos

Author

Listed:
  • Elvio Accinelli

    () (Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República)

  • Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera

    () (Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a society composed of citizens grouped in different economic strata based on income, who must pay taxes, but there are incentives to do so, and a set of public officials (auditors), whose function is to monitor compliance with the tax rules among citizens. We assume that corrupt auditors can accept bribes from evaders. We show that income inequality as a driver acts of corruption and tax evasion. Next we introduce an evolutionary model to analyze the progress or regression of evasion and corruption among public officials. We conclude with some observations on policies and incentives to combat these social ills.

Suggested Citation

  • Elvio Accinelli & Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera, 2014. "Corrupción, desigualdad y evasión de impuestos," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0514, Department of Economics - dECON.
  • Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:0514
    as

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    File URL: http://cienciassociales.edu.uy/departamentodeeconomia/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/11/0514.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    2. Jain, Arvind K, 2001. " Corruption: A Review," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 71-121, February.
    3. Sanjeev Gupta, 1998. "Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?," IMF Working Papers 98/76, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999. "Corruption, extortion and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 395-430, December.
    5. Accinelli, Elvio & Carrera, Edgar J. Sánchez, 2012. "Corruption driven by imitative behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 84-87.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    corrupt behavior; taxes; evolutionary game.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O55 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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