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Corruption driven by imitative behavior

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  • Accinelli, Elvio
  • Carrera, Edgar J. Sánchez

Abstract

One can restructure institutions, but if individual-level motivations for corrupt behavior are not understood, these restructuring may not be effective. We introduce an evolutionary-game modeling to deal with the problem of corruption driven by imitative behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Accinelli, Elvio & Carrera, Edgar J. Sánchez, 2012. "Corruption driven by imitative behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 84-87.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:84-87
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.092
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schlag, Karl H., 1999. "Which one should I imitate?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 493-522, May.
    2. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2005. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 385-472, Elsevier.
    3. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    4. Mishra, Ajit, 2006. "Persistence of corruption: some theoretical perspectives," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 349-358, February.
    5. Wydick,Bruce, 2008. "Games in Economic Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521687157, Enero-Abr.
    6. Greif,Avner, 2006. "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671347, September.
    7. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    8. Philippe Aghion, 2005. "Growth and Institutions," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 3-18, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Yefeng & Ding, Yuli & Mao, Lei & Pan, Yiwen & Wang, Xue, 2024. "How corruption prevails: A laboratory experiment," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    2. Gen-Fu Feng & Bo Sui & Min-Yi Dong & Chun-xia Jiang & Chun-Ping Chang, 2018. "Border is better than distance? Contagious corruption in one belt one road economies," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 52(4), pages 1909-1928, July.
    3. Elena Gubar & Edgar Javier Sanchez Carrera & Suriya Kumacheva & Ekaterina Zhitkova & Galina Tomilina, 2018. "Games and Network Structures on Corruption, Income Inequality, and Tax Control," Working Papers 1808, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini, revised 2018.
    4. Rosas-Martinez, Victor H., 2016. "Expectations Over Durable Assets: How to Avoid the Formation of Value Bubbles," MPRA Paper 75350, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Bo Sui & Gen-Fu Feng & Chun-Ping Chang, 2018. "The pioneer evidence of contagious corruption," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 945-968, March.
    6. Elvio Accinelli & Osvaldo Salas, 2019. "El estado de bienestar como un bien público no excluible / The welfare state as a public good not excludable," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 34(2), pages 243-273.
    7. W. C. Abram & K. Noray, 2018. "Political Corruption and Public Activism: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 1-21, March.
    8. Elvio Accinelli & Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera, 2014. "Corrupción, desigualdad y evasión de impuestos," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0514, Department of Economics - dECON.
    9. Accinelli, Elvio, 2015. "Instituciones, economía clásica y economía evolutiva," Panorama Económico, Escuela Superior de Economía, Instituto Politécnico Nacional, vol. 0(21), pages 7-26, julio-dic.
    10. Victor H. ROSAS-MARTINEZ, 2016. "On Behavioral Macroeconomics, Globalization, and Economic Growth," Journal of Economics Bibliography, KSP Journals, vol. 3(3), pages 482-489, September.
    11. Jandhyala, Srividya & Oliveira, Fernando S., 2021. "The role of international anti-corruption regulations in promoting socially responsible practices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 15-32.
    12. Daniel Gingerich & Virginia Oliveros & Ana Corbacho & Mauricio Ruiz-Vega, 2015. "Corruption as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Costa Rica," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 88334, Inter-American Development Bank.
    13. Stojanovikj, Martin, 2022. "Can inflation targeting reduce price information asymmetry and alleviate corruptive behavior? Evidence from developing countries," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 46(3).

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • P37 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal

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