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The Evolutionary Game Of Poverty Traps

Author

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  • ELVIO ACCINELLI
  • EDGAR J. SANCHEZ CARRERA

Abstract

We study an evolutionary game in which the individual behavior of the economic agents can lead the economy either into a low-level or a high-level equilibrium. The model represents two asymmetric populations, “leaders and followers”, where in each round an economic agent of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. Our evolutionary game is a signaling game in which only the leader has private information. The leader moves first; the follower observes the leader's action, but not the leader's type, before choosing her own action. We found the equilibria both as self-confirming and evolutionarily stable strategies. Furthermore, considering an imitative behavior of the followers, we show that to overcome the poverty trap there exists a threshold value equals to the ratio "education costs-efficiency wages" of the number of high-profile economic agents
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Suggested Citation

  • Elvio Accinelli & Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera, 2012. "The Evolutionary Game Of Poverty Traps," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 80(4), pages 381-400, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:manchs:v:80:y:2012:i:4:p:381-400
    DOI: j.1467-9957.2011.02262.x
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02262.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Joao Paulo A. de Souza & Leopoldo Gómez‐Ramírez, 2021. "Industrialization and skill acquisition in an evolutionary model of coordination failures," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(4), pages 849-867, November.
    2. Edgar Carrera, 2012. "Imitation and evolutionary stability of poverty traps," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-20, April.
    3. Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera, 2019. "Evolutionary dynamics of poverty traps," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 611-630, April.
    4. Sanchez-Carrera Edgar J. & Ille Sebastian & Travaglini Giuseppe, 2021. "Macrodynamic Modeling of Innovation Equilibria and Traps," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 21(2), pages 659-694, June.
    5. Edgar Villa & Andr�s Salazar, 2013. "Poverty traps, economic inequality and incentives for delinquency," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID.
    6. Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera & Elena Gubar & Andrey F. Oleynik, 2019. "Network Structures and Poverty Traps," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 236-253, March.
    7. Saúl Mendoza-Palacios & Julen Berasaluce & Alfonso Mercado, 2021. "Industrialization and human resources training: an approach of policies coordination," Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos 2021-01, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos.
    8. Mikhail Anufriev & Davide Radi & Fabio Tramontana, 2018. "Some reflections on past and future of nonlinear dynamics in economics and finance," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 41(2), pages 91-118, November.
    9. Barreira da Silva Rocha, André, 2013. "Evolutionary dynamics of nationalism and migration," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 392(15), pages 3183-3197.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • I30 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General

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