Does Centralization Imply Better Targeting?: Evaluating Emergency Employment Programs in Chile
This paper develops direct tests for evaluating the performance of two types of emergency employment programs put in place in Chile since 1999. Our results suggest: First, decentralized and “market-driven” programs (subsidies for hiring and training) are more efficient in terms of productivity, but are targeted to people that are less vulnerable to unemployment. Second, direct employment programs result in moderate increases of the income of the households of the participants. This increase may be outweighted by the costs (in present value) associated with higher school drop-out and participation rates. Third, if analysed at a municipality level (comuna), centralized programs do not target municipalities with higher unemployment, increased vulnerability to unemployment, or even lower median income levels, but are strongly correlated with the political affiliation of its major. Finally, our results suggest that the population targeted in direct employment programs is not more vulnerable to unemployment than the actually unemployed.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Raphael Bergoeing & Felipe Morandé, 2002.
"Crecimiento, Empleo e Impuestos al Trabajo: Chile 1998-2001,"
Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía,
Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 39(117), pages 157-174.
- Raphael Bergoeing & Felipe Morandé, 2002. "Crecimiento, Empleo e Impuestos al Trabajo: Chile 1998-2001," Working Papers wp193, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
- Raphael Bergoeing & Felipe Morandé, 2002. "Crecimiento, empleo e impuestos al trabajo: Chile 1998-2001," Documentos de Trabajo 127, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp199. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rafael Carranza)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.