IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

"Download for Free" - When Do Providers of Digital Goods Offer Free Samples?

  • Boom, Anette

In a monopoly setting where consumers cannot observe the quality of the product we show that free samples which are of a lower quality than the marketed digital goods are used together with high prices as signals for a superior quality if the number of informed consumers is small and if the difference between the high and the low quality is not too small. Social welfare is higher, if the monopolist uses also free samples as signals, compared to a situation where he is restricted to pure price signalling. Both, the monopolist and consumers benefit from the additional signal.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13480/1/70.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 70.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Sep 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:70
Contact details of provider: Postal: Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-3405
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3510
Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
  2. Berger, Helge & Hefeker, Carsten, 2005. "One Country, One Vote? Labor Market Structure and Voting Rights in the ECB," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 20, pages 672-687.
  3. Sebastien Lecocq & Thierry Magnac & Marie-Claude Pichery & Michael Visser, 2004. "The impact of information on wine auction prices: results of an experiment," Research Unit Working Papers 0401, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA.
  4. José Luis Moraga-González, 1997. "Quality Uncertainty and Informative Advertising," CIE Discussion Papers 1997-19, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  5. Sabine Stephan, 2002. "German Exports to the Euro Area," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 286, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  6. Kyle Bagwell & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 2005. "Look How Little I’m Advertising!," CIE Discussion Papers 2005-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  7. Kamp, Brad, 1998. "Complimentarily yours: Free examination copies and textbook prices: Comment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 527-533, July.
  8. Foster, James E. & Horowitz, Andrew W., 1996. "Complimentarily yours: Free examination copies and textbook prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 85-99.
  9. Orzach, Ram & Overgaard, Per Baltzer & Tauman, Yair, 2002. "Modest Advertising Signals Strength," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 340-358, Summer.
  10. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
  11. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 2002. "The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 513-31, July.
  12. repec:fth:inseep:9936 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Volckart, Oliver & Wolf, Nikolaus, 2004. "Estimating medieval market integration: Evidence from exchange rates," Discussion Papers 2004/21, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  14. Hao Zhao, 2000. "Raising Awareness and Signaling Quality to Uninformed Consumers: A Price-Advertising Model," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(4), pages 390-396, January.
  15. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-39, March.
  17. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:70. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandra Frank)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.