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Climate Policy Commitment Devices

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  • Dengler, Sebastian

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Gerlagh, Reyer

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Trautmann, Stefan

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • van de Kuilen, Gijs

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

We develop a dynamic resource extraction game that mimics the global multi-generation planning problem for climate change and fossil fuel extraction. We implement the game under different conditions in the laboratory. Compared to a ‘libertarian’ baseline condition, we find that policy interventions that provide a costly commitment device or reduce climate threshold uncertainty reduce resource extraction. We also study two conditions to assess the underlying social preferences and the viability of ecological dictatorship. Our results suggest that climate-change policies that focus on investments that lock the economy into carbon-free energy sources provide an important commitment device in the intertemporal cooperation problem.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Dengler, Sebastian & Gerlagh, Reyer & Trautmann, Stefan & van de Kuilen, Gijs, 2017. "Climate Policy Commitment Devices," Discussion Paper 2017-036, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:a2362a52-35cf-4e23-90c9-5ba024f19391
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    Cited by:

    1. Helena Fornwagner & Oliver P. Hauser, 2022. "Climate Action for (My) Children," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 81(1), pages 95-130, January.
    2. Helena Fornwagner & Oliver P. Hauser, 2020. "Climate action for (my) children," Working Papers 2020-23, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
    3. Riccardo Ghidoni & Anna Lou Abatayo & Valentina Bosetti & Marco Casari & Massimo Tavoni, 2021. "Governing climate geoengineering: Side-payments are not enough," Working Papers 461, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2021.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    climate policy instruments; intertemporal cooperation; climate game; experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D99 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Other
    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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