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Enforcement spillovers: Lessons from strategic interactions in regulation and product markets

Author

Listed:
  • Mary F. Evans

    (The Robert Day School of Economics and Finance, Claremont McKenna College)

  • Scott M. Gilpatric

    (Department of Economics, University of Tennessee)

  • Jay P. Shimshack

    (Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia)

Abstract

We explore mechanisms driving enforcement spillovers - when sanctions at one entity influence behavior at other entities. Our model illustrates when spillovers arise from a regulatory channel and when they arise from a channel not emphasized in the existing literature: product markets. Using facility-by-month data from Clean Water Act manufacturers, we find that penalties generate strong positive spillovers for other facilities facing the same authority. We find suggestive evidence that penalties generate negative spillovers for facilities in the same industry but facing a different authority. Results are consistent with spillovers driven by strategic interactions in both regulation and product markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Mary F. Evans & Scott M. Gilpatric & Jay P. Shimshack, 2015. "Enforcement spillovers: Lessons from strategic interactions in regulation and product markets," Working Papers 2015-08, University of Tennessee, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ten:wpaper:2015-08
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    Cited by:

    1. Colmer, Jonathan Mark & Evans, Mary F. & Shimshack, Jay, 2023. "Environmental citizen complaints," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121326, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Shimshack, Jay P. & Ward, Michael B., 2022. "Costly sanctions and the treatment of frequent violators in regulatory settings," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    3. Earnhart, Dietrich & Friesen, Lana, 2021. "Use of competitive endogenous audit mechanisms by federal and state inspectors within environmental protection agencies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    4. Xiaomeng Charlene Chen & Ka Wai Choi & Sue Wright & Hai Wu, 2023. "The effectiveness of sanctions on disclosure regulation: Australian evidence," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(4), pages 3841-3872, December.
    5. Blundell, Wesley & Evans, Mary F. & Stafford, Sarah L., 2021. "Regulating hazardous wastes under U.S. environmental federalism: The role of state resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    6. M. Martin Boyer & Philippe d'Astous, 2023. "Tax compliance and firm response to electronic sales monitoring," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(4), pages 1430-1468, November.
    7. Berlinski, Samuel & Gagete-Miranda, Jessica, 2024. "Enforcement Spillovers under Different Networks: The Case of Quotas for Persons with Disabilities in Brazil," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 13681, Inter-American Development Bank.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    general deterrence; strategic substitutes; strategic complements; pollution policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • R10 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General

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