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Enforcement spillovers: Lessons from strategic interactions in regulation and product markets

Author

Listed:
  • Mary F. Evans

    () (The Robert Day School of Economics and Finance, Claremont McKenna College)

  • Scott M. Gilpatric

    () (Department of Economics, University of Tennessee)

  • Jay P. Shimshack

    () (Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia)

Abstract

We explore mechanisms driving enforcement spillovers - when sanctions at one entity influence behavior at other entities. Our model illustrates when spillovers arise from a regulatory channel and when they arise from a channel not emphasized in the existing literature: product markets. Using facility-by-month data from Clean Water Act manufacturers, we find that penalties generate strong positive spillovers for other facilities facing the same authority. We find suggestive evidence that penalties generate negative spillovers for facilities in the same industry but facing a different authority. Results are consistent with spillovers driven by strategic interactions in both regulation and product markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Mary F. Evans & Scott M. Gilpatric & Jay P. Shimshack, 2015. "Enforcement spillovers: Lessons from strategic interactions in regulation and product markets," Working Papers 2015-08, University of Tennessee, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ten:wpaper:2015-08
    as

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    File URL: http://web.utk.edu/~jhollad3/RePEc/2015-08.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    general deterrence; strategic substitutes; strategic complements; pollution policy;

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • R10 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General

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