Alfred E. Kahn 1917-2010
This article, an introduction to a compedium dedicated to the life of Alfred E. Kahn, reviews his academic research and policy interests and how they evolved, his activities as a regulator and advisor to governments and companies, and the interactions between his real-world experiences and his academic work. Although Kahn is best known for his research on the economics of regulation and his application of microeconomic principles in his role as a regulator and advisor, his academic research portfolio is much more diverse. He also wrote papers on patent policy, economic development, antitrust policy and other topics. Even before becoming a regulator he was actively involved in applying economic principles to regulatory problems as an advisor and consultant. In all of his work Kahn recognized that markets were imperfect, but that policies aimed at improving market performance often made things worse rather than better. His experience as a regulator and consultant strengthened his recognition that the costs of imperfect regulation had to be carefully balanced against the costs of imperfect markets. One had to search for the best that could be done in an imperfect world. Kahn was particularly fascinated by the challenges of of designing and implementing policies to govern the transition of industries from regulated monopolies or oligopolies to industries that would ultimately rely primarily on competitive markets to govern their behavior and performance. Fred Kahn was an extraordinary man and he will be missed greatly by his many friends and colleagues representing a wide range of political orientations and approaches to economic and public policy analysis.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2012|
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- Kahn, Alfred E, 1979. "Applications of Economics to an Imperfect World," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(2), pages 1-13, May.
- Kahn, Alfred E. & Tardiff, Timothy J. & Weisman, Dennis L., 1999. "The Telecommunications Act at three years: an economic evaluation of its implementation by the Federal Communications Commission," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 319-365, December.
- Severin Borenstein, 1989. "Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the U.S. Airline Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 344-365, Autumn.
- J. A. K., 1985. "Introduction," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 7(4), pages 504-507, July.
- Rosenberg, Nathan, 1990. "Why do firms do basic research (with their own money)?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 165-174, April.
- Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
- Paul L. Joskow, 2002. "Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 95-116, April.
- Rosston Gregory L. & Noll Roger G., 2002. "The Economics of the Supreme Court's Decision On Forward Looking Costs," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2), pages 1-9, September.
- repec:reg:rpubli:433 is not listed on IDEAS
- Elizabeth E. Bailey, 2002. "Aviation Policy: Past and Present," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 12-20, July.
- Severin Borenstein, 1991. "The Dominant-Firm Advantage in Multiproduct Industries: Evidence from the U. S. Airlines," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1237-1266.
- J. R. Hicks, 1953. "A Reply," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(3), pages 218-221.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, March.
- M. A. Adelman, 1949. "The A & P Case: A Study in Applied Economic Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 238-257.
- Kahn, Alfred E, 2002. "The Deregulatory Tar Baby: The Precarious Balance Between Regulation and Deregulation, 1970-2000 and Henceforward," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 35-56, January.
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