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Regulatory Choices and Commitment: Challenges for Electricity Market Regulation in Kosovo

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  • Lars Kumkar

Abstract

This article describes choices to be made in selecting and implementing a reform model for the electricity industry and derives some implications for the situation in Kosovo. The article argues that the appropriate reform model depends on the circumstances in the jurisdiction being considered. Especially in small and less developed electricity systems, a dilemma may emerge: the technical circumstances suggest the implementation of a model with few competitive elements, whereas political circumstances urge a competition-oriented model. Hence, especially in small systems, a delicate trade-off emerges that significantly complicates the decisions to be made. This is obviously relevant for Kosovo. International opening of Kosovo's electricity market may provide a solution to the dilemma. This would encompass a reduction of state sovereignty for electricity regulation and wide-reaching market opening for private investors and electricity traders.

Suggested Citation

  • Lars Kumkar, 2003. "Regulatory Choices and Commitment: Challenges for Electricity Market Regulation in Kosovo," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(1), pages 91-115.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:pocoec:v:15:y:2003:i:1:p:91-115
    DOI: 10.1080/1463137032000058403
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy
    • P3 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions
    • L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities

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